Imagining a false alibi impairs concealed memory detection with the autobiographical Implicit Association Test by Dhammapeera, Phot et al.
Running head: IMAGINING A FALSE ALIBI IMPAIRS MEMORY DETECTION 
 
Accepted manuscript, to be published in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 
 
Imagining a false alibi impairs concealed memory detection with the 
autobiographical Implicit Association Test 
 
Phot Dhammapeera1,2, Xiaoqing Hu3,4, Zara M. Bergström1 
1School of Psychology, University of Kent, UK 
2Faculty of Psychology, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand 
3Department of Psychology, The State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, 
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China 
4HKU-Shenzhen Institute of Research and Innovation, Shenzhen, China  
 
Correspondence should be addressed to Zara Bergström, School of Psychology, Keynes 
College, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NP, UK. E-mail: 
z.m.bergstrom@kent.ac.uk 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank Jessica Amos, Ellie Anslow, Ashley Bailey, Chloe Brunskill, 
Rhiannon Chappell, Amber Gardner, Lucy Hendleman, Catalina Marin, Chloe Walker, and Eleanor 
Webster for help with data collection. This research did not receive any specific grant from 
funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Declaration of interests: 
none. 
© 2019, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and 
may not exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not 
copy or cite without authors' permission. The final article will be available, upon 
publication, via its DOI: 10.1037/xap0000250 




Imagining counterfactual versions of past events can distort memory. In three experiments, 
we examined whether imagining a false alibi for a mock crime would make suspects appear 
less guilty in a concealed memory detection test, the autobiographical Implicit Association 
Test (aIAT), which aims to determine which of two autobiographical events are true. First, 
“guilty” participants completed a mock crime, whereas “innocent” participants completed an 
innocent act. Next, some of the guilty participants were asked to imagine a false alibi that 
corresponded to the innocent act. Finally, all groups completed the aIAT. Across 
experiments, we varied the type of aIAT used and also compared the effectiveness of the 
false alibi countermeasure when only imagined once, versus when it was repeatedly imagined 
over a week long period. The aIAT accurately detected the mock crime as true for guilty 
participants without a false alibi, but was consistently less able to detect the mock crime as 
true for guilty participants who had imagined a false alibi. The findings suggest that if guilty 
suspects fabricate an alibi, this may create a memory for the alibi that appears to be true 
based on the aIAT, which is problematic for its real-life applications in concealed memory 
detection. 
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Public significance statement: We found that rehearsing a false alibi can impair truth 
detection with a computerized test, the autobiographical Implicit Association Test. This 
finding is important because it suggests the test is vulnerable to faking, and that real life 
applications of this test are premature. 
 
 




Forensic memory detection aims to determine if a criminal suspect has concealed information 
stored in their memory that is indicative of guilt. Guilty suspects are expected to have unique 
knowledge of the crime that would not be known by innocent suspects. Therefore, non-verbal 
markers of memory, such as memory-related brain activity (e.g. Allen, Iacono, & Danielson, 
1992; Gamer, Klimecki, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2012; Rosenfeld, Angell, Johnson, & 
Qian, 1991; Van Hooff, Brunia, & Allen, 1996), autonomic activity (Gamer, 2011; Lykken, 
1959) or reaction times and accuracy on indirect memory tests (Sartori et al., 2008; 
Verschuere & De Houwer, 2011), can be measured to detect if a suspect is concealing 
incriminating knowledge. Many of these methods can very accurately detect concealed 
information, at least in cooperative research participants with little motivation to hide their 
guilt (Granhag, Vrij & Vershuere, 2015; Verschuere, Ben-Shakar & Meijer, 2011). However, 
one prominent concern is that real criminals may use countermeasure strategies to attempt to 
hide their guilt (e.g. Bergström, Anderson, Buda, Simons, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2013; Hu, 
Bergström, Bodenhausen, & Rosenfeld, 2015; Verschuere, Prati & De Houwer, 2009; for a 
review, see Ben-Shakhar, 2011), threatening the validity of these tests in real-life settings. 
Considering the important societal, legal and ethical implications of forensic memory 
detection, it is therefore critical to evaluate whether memory detection tests are susceptible to 
countermeasures. It is also important to assess which types of countermeasures are likely to 
be successful in order to ensure that memory detection tests are optimally designed to 
withstand evasion attempts.  
The autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT, Sartori, Agosta, 
Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), is a computerised task that bears high promise in 
assessing the implicit truth value of autobiographical statements, which can therefore be 
used to detect concealed autobiographical memories. The aIAT measures reaction times 
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and accuracy in a simple sentence classification task as markers of whether an 
autobiographical event is true or false for an individual, and is thus considerably easier 
and cheaper to implement than physiology and brain activity-based techniques that 
necessitate specialist equipment and highly trained administrators. In a criminal context 
(e.g. Sartori et al., 2008), the aIAT involves presenting suspects four different types of 
statements that suspects have to classify on two dimensions: logically true versus false, or 
crime-related versus innocent-related, by pressing two different buttons. Sentences for the 
first dimension are true or false for everyone taking the test (e.g. true: “I am in front of a 
computer” vs. false: “I am in a restaurant”), whereas the truth of sentences for the second 
dimension depend on whether the suspect has committed the crime or not (e.g. true if 
guilty/false if innocent: “I stole a ring” (a crime-related sentence) vs. false if guilty/true if 
innocent: “I bought a ring”(an innocence-related sentence). In guilt congruent blocks, 
logically true and crime-related statements share one button, whilst logically false and 
innocent-related statements share another button. In guilt incongruent blocks, logically 
false and crime-related statements share one button, whilst logically true and innocent-
related statements share another button. Guilty suspects are expected to respond faster and 
more accurately in guilt congruent than incongruent blocks due to crime-related sentences 
having implicit and automatic associations with the truth. Innocent suspects are expected 
to show the opposite pattern.  
Many studies have shown very accurate memory detection using the aIAT 
(reviewed in Agosta & Sartori, 2013; however see Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van 
Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, & Crombez, 2017; for evidence that the aIAT may be less 
effective than other RT-based memory detection paradigms). Moreover, the aIAT is not 
only able to detect which of two autobiographical events is more strongly associated with 
truth, but is also better at detecting true memories than false memories that the participant 
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believes are true (Marini, Agosta, Mazzoni, Dalla Barba, & Sartori, 2012). Because of 
such promising results, the aIAT has already been applied in at least one real court case in 
Italy, where it was used by the defense team as part of a battery of tests to suggest that the 
defendant had memory impairments, which was accepted by the judge as evidence of 
diminished culpability and contributed to a reduced penalty for a convicted murderer 
(Sirgiovanni, Corbellini, & Caporale, 2016). In contrast, other research has shown that the 
aIAT may be susceptible to relatively simple countermeasures that guilty suspects can 
apply during the test, such as slowing down responses in the guilt congruent blocks 
(Verschuere, Prati, & Houwer, 2009) or speeding up responses in the guilt incongruent 
blocks (Hu, Rosenfeld & Bodenhausen, 2012), especially when participants are allowed 
to practice in advance of the test. However, suspects who used such strategies may be 
caught out by selectively modifying their response times only during critical blocks but 
not during other, non-critical blocks (Agosta, Ghirardi, Zogmaister, Castiello, & Sartori, 
2011). Thus, trying to beat the aIAT by directly altering response times may not be a 
particularly effective countermeasure, since such faking attempts may be detectable by 
unusual patterns of response times across different blocks (although see Hu et al., 2012). 
An alternative strategy that guilty suspects could use for evading forensic memory 
detection is to intentionally modify their memories in advance of the test, in order to make 
these memories more consistent with innocence. A large body of evidence shows that 
memories for experienced events remain malleable after encoding and can be updated or 
inhibited at a later stage (e.g. Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Dudai, 2012). Indeed, in 
several experiments we have found that by intentionally suppressing memories of 
committing a mock crime, guilty suspects were able to significantly reduce retrieval-
related ERPs thus increasing the likelihood of appearing innocent on an EEG-based 
memory detection test (Bergström, et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2015). Furthermore, suppression 
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of mock crime memories weakened the associative strength between the crime and the 
truth so that guilty suspects also appeared more innocent on a later aIAT, even without 
engaging any intentional strategies during the aIAT itself (Hu et al., 2015). Thus, 
modifying memories in advance of a memory detection test may be an effective 
countermeasure strategy that is less detectable than on-line faking attempts during the test 
itself. 
Whereas previous research showed that suspects can intentionally weaken 
incriminating memories to evade detection, another strategy by which guilty suspects could 
appear innocent is to intentionally store false information in memory that suggests innocence. 
It is well established that people can hold vivid memories for events that they have never 
experienced in real life (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Schacter, Guerin & St Jacques, 2011). Such 
memories can be created simply by imagining a novel event (Loftus, 2003) that becomes 
encoded as a memory representation with similar perceptual and conceptual features as a 
memory based on an experienced event, making true and false memories similar in terms of 
their neural and behavioural characteristics (Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). Consistent with this 
view, imagining performing simple actions (such as picking a specific card from a deck of 
playing cards) enhances implicit associations between the imagined event and the truth when 
contrasted with non-imagined events in an aIAT. Some research found this to be the case 
particularly when participants misremembered imagined actions as previously performed 
(Takarangi, Strange, Shortland, & James, 2013), whereas in other studies, aIAT truth 
detection of imagined actions was enhanced even when participants knew the imagined event 
did not occur in real life (Shidlovski, Shul, & Mayo, 2014; see also Mangiulli, Lanciano, 
Curci, et al.,  2018; Takarangi, Strange & Houghton, 2015; Vargo, Petróczi, Shah, & 
Naughton, 2014). Furthermore, in a mock criminal context, asking people to deliberately 
memorise a hypothetical alternative version of a mock crime can weaken skin conductance 
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responses associated with a true mock crime, and thereby impair memory detection with 
autonomic measures (Gronau, Elber, Satran, Breska & Ben-Shakar, 2015).  
However, to our knowledge, no previous research has investigated whether guilty 
suspects can intentionally memorise false information indicative of innocence as a 
countermeasure strategy for evading guilt detection with the aIAT. In real life, guilty suspects 
may fabricate an untrue version of what they were doing at the time of the crime to use as a 
false alibi, and by doing so, they may encode this information into memory in a form that 
may share some characteristics with a true memory, which may potentially also distort or 
impair their memory for the true crime event (Otgaar & Baker, 2018). Recent research has 
shown that adopting a false alibi can impair identification of guilty suspects in deception 
detection paradigms (Foerster, Wirth, Herbort, Kunde, & Pfister, 2017; Suchotzki, Berlijn, 
Donath, & Gamer, 2018), but this issue has not been investigated with the aIAT. We 
addressed these issues in three experiments that used the aIAT to investigate whether 
imagining a false alibi impaired guilt detection by enhancing the implicit truth value of an 
alibi and/or decreasing the implicit truth value of a committed mock crime. We also 
investigated whether the alibi countermeasure was more effective when applied repeatedly 
over an extended time period compared to just in one brief session. To preempt the results, 
we found a consistent pattern across studies whereby the false alibi significantly impaired 
guilt detection with the aIAT, which seemed to be primarily driven by the alibi being 
detected as true rather than a substantial impairment of the original mock crime memory. 
Experiment 1 
The first experiment was conducted in three stages. First, “guilty” participants carried out a 
mock crime which involved stealing a ring from a bag in a University staff office area, 
whereas “innocent” participants carried out an innocent act that involved going to the same 
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office area but instead writing their email address on a paper slip on a staff member’s door. 
Next, half of the guilty participants were instructed to imagine performing the innocent act 
with the explicit intention of using this as a false alibi in order to appear innocent. The other 
half of guilty participants and the innocent group performed an unrelated filler task. Finally, 
all three groups undertook an aIAT where the relative truth value of the mock crime and 
innocent/false alibi events were compared in all three groups.  
We hypothesised that imagining a false alibi would create a memory for the imagined 
act, which may have some implicit associations with the truth even though participants knew 
their alibi was fake at an explicit level (Shidlovski, et al., 2014). Imagining a fake alibi would 
thus lead to lower aIAT discrimination between the objectively true mock crime and the 
objectively false innocent act when this group was compared to the guilty group who did not 
imagine the alibi. If imagining an alibi as a countermeasure was completely successful at 
making guilty suspects appear innocent, aIAT performance for these guilty participants 
would be indistinguishable from the innocent group who actually conducted the innocent act 




The design was based on our previous experiment which included 78 participants divided 
across three groups and found a large effect size (Cohen’s d=0.78) for reduced aIAT 
memory detection in a suppression countermeasure group compared to a standard guilty 
group (Hu et al., 2015). That prior experiment was designed to have 0.8 power to detect a 
d=0.8 effect size, and we increased our sample size in the current study to further enhance 
statistical power, and therefore recruited 108 participants who were split into three 
groups, resulting in >0.9 power to detect a d=0.8 effect size, or 0.8 power to detect a 
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d=0.7 effect size (we decided a priori that we were primarily interested in detecting large 
effects of the alibi countermeasure on the aIAT, as only large countermeasure effects have 
substantial implications for practical applications involving guilt classification at the 
individual level). The participants were undergraduate students at the University of Kent 
who took part via a research participation scheme in return for course credits. Participants 
were randomly assigned to three experimental groups (N = 36 in each); the Guilty-Alibi 
group (30 female and 6 male), the Guilty-Standard group (29 female and 7 male), and the 
Innocent group (28 female and 8 male). Twenty additional participants were replaced due 
to technical problems or not following the instructions during the mock crime/innocent 
act (such as stealing the wrong object, or going to the wrong part of the building). 
Participants’ age ranged from 18-28 (M = 19.83, SD = 1.62). The groups did not 
significantly differ in terms of age (F(2,104) = .80, p = .451, ηp2 = .02) nor gender (χ2(2) = 
.36, p = .837, φ = .84). All participants had English as their first language, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and had no diagnosis of dyslexia. The study was approved by 
the University of Kent Psychology Ethics committee. 
Materials, design and procedure 
First, participants in the two Guilty groups were required to go to a kitchen adjacent to 
staff offices in a university building, find a bag, and steal a box from inside the bag. They 
were explicitly asked to look and take note of what was inside the box (a ring), and then 
return with the box and its content to the experimental room. The word ring was not 
mentioned in the instructions so that the memory of the ring was gained solely from 
enacting the crime. Innocent participants were required to go to the same area in the 
building, but instead they were told to write their email address on an appointment sign-
up sheet on the door of a lecturer’s office. Thus, Innocent participants were unaware of 
the mock crime.  
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 Next, participants in the Guilty-Alibi group were provided with a fake alibi 
scenario, which was designed to help them appear innocent on the aIAT. Participants 
were told that they would soon take part in a test designed to detect their guilt, however 
they should aim to appear innocent by adopting the alibi. Participants were instructed that 
it was essential that they try to imagine the scenario as if it were true and that their 
memory for scenario details would later be tested. The alibi scenario was a short verbal 
description of the innocent act: “You were on your way to find your lecturer. On their 
door, there was a sheet of paper specifying that you could leave your email address for the 
lecturer to get back to you. So you tore off a bit of paper and wrote your email address 
and left it in the envelope provided and came back here. The envelope has since been 
destroyed so there is no evidence that your alibi is false”. Participants were told to close 
their eyes and vividly imagine the alibi for two minutes. Next, they were asked to 
describe the scenario in detail and answer a few questions about it. If they gave incorrect 
answers, the alibi story was repeated and the questions asked again until the correct 
answers were given. Participants in the Guilty-Standard and Innocent groups were instead 
required to carry out a filler task of solving Sudoku puzzles. They were given two puzzles 
as well as written instructions and told to do the best they could while they were timed for 
5 minutes.  
In the final stage, all participants took part in a seven-block computerised aIAT (Hu et 
al., 2015; Sartori et al., 2008). Participants were instructed that multiple sentences would 
appear on the screen and they would need to classify them as either logically true or false, or 
ring-related or email-related by pressing left or right buttons on the keyboard. To avoid on-
line attempts to modify the test result, they were not informed regarding how the test worked 
or how to alter their responses to appear innocent (cf. Agosta et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2012; 
Verschuere et al., 2009). The first block (20 trials) was a simple classification block that 
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required participants to classify 5 true and 5 false sentences, with each sentence repeated 
twice in random order. Participants were instructed to press the left key ‘Z’ for logically true 
sentences (e.g., “I am a research participant”) and the right key ‘M’ for logically false 
sentences (e.g., “I am playing football”), based on what they were doing at that time. The 
labels “True” and “False” were displayed on the left and right sides of the screen 
respectively, to remind participants of the response-key mapping. The second block (20 
trials) was a simple classification block that required participants to classify 5 sentences 
related to the guilty act (e.g., “I took a ring”) and 5 sentences related to the innocent act/alibi 
scenario (e.g., “I wrote my email”). Participants were asked to press the left key ‘Z’ for ring-
related sentences and the right key ‘M’ for email-related sentences, and the labels “Ring” and 
“Email” were displayed on the left and right sides of the screen respectively. Blocks three (20 
trials) and four (40 trials) were critical double classification blocks which tested participants’ 
responses to guilt congruent sentence pairings, because logically true and autobiographically 
true sentences for the Guilty groups were paired to the same response button. Participants 
were instructed to press ‘Z’ if the sentence was logically true or ring-related and ‘M’ if the 
sentence was logically false or email-related, and the labels “True/Ring” and “False/Email” 
were displayed on the left and right sides of the screen respectively. Block five (20 trials) was 
a practice reverse simple classification block, which reversed the key assignments for ring 
and email-related sentences (‘Z’ for email-related and ‘M’ for ring-related sentences, with the 
left label changed to “Email” and the right label changed to “Ring”). The final blocks six (20 
trials) and seven (40 trials) were also critical double classification blocks with the reversed 
keys, thus testing participants’ responses to guilt incongruent sentence pairings, because 
logically false and autobiographically true sentences for the Guilty groups were paired to the 
same response button. Participants were instructed to press ‘Z’ if the sentence was logically 
true or email-related and ‘M’ if the sentence was logically false or ring-related, and the labels 
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“True/Email” and “False/Ring” were displayed on the left and right sides of the screen 
respectively. Faster RT and higher accuracy for guilt congruent blocks than guilt incongruent 
blocks indicate an association between the crime and the truth, whereas the reverse pattern 
indicate an association between the innocent act and the truth. 
Half of the participants within each group conducted the blocks in the order 
described above, while blocks 2-4 and 5-7 were swapped for the other half of participants 
in order to counterbalance the order of guilt congruent and guilt incongruent blocks. Thus, 
counterbalancing formats were balanced within groups and matched across groups. For all 
blocks, sentences were presented on the screen in random order, and stayed on the screen 
until participants pressed a button. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible, and if they pressed the incorrect button a red ‘X’ appeared on the 
screen until the pressed the correct button.  
Data analysis 
The main measure of guilt in the aIAT is the D-score, which combines accuracy 
and RT into a single, standardized measure (Greenwald et al., 2003; Sartori et al., 2008). 
We used the same formula to calculate D as in the most relevant previous studies (Hu et 
al., 2012; 2015). First, extreme RTs (<100ms or >10,000ms) were deleted. As in prior 
research, incorrect responses were given a 600ms penalty, and the mean RTs were 
calculated for the guilt congruent and guilt incongruent blocks separately, including the 
incorrect responses with the applied penalties. Finally, the mean RT difference between 
guilt congruent and guilt incongruent blocks was divided by the standard deviation of the 
RT distribution for correct trials only, from both blocks combined, in order to obtain the 
D-score. In the Experiment 1 version of the aIAT, a positive D-score indicated guilt 
because it suggests that participants associated sentences describing the mock crime with 
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the truth, whereas a negative D-score indicated innocence because it suggests that 
participants associated sentences describing the innocent act with the truth.  
Potential group differences in D-scores were analysed with commonly used 
frequentist inferential tests from the GLM (ANOVA, t-tests). Effect sizes were estimated 
using partial eta-squared for ANOVAs, and Cohen’s d for t-tests. Cohen’s d for both 
paired and independent t-tests was calculated as the difference between means divided by 
the pooled standard deviation rather than from the t-values to avoid inflating effect size 
estimates for paired t-tests (Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996). As the key 
hypotheses relied on testing whether D-scores were above or below zero within each 
group and whether there were pairwise group differences in D-scores, frequentist t-tests 
for such differences were supplemented with Bayes factors (BF10) to evaluate the relative 
support for a difference (H1) versus no difference (H0). These were calculated with 
Bayesian t-tests in JASP (JASP Team, 2017) using default priors (a Cauchy distribution 
with centre = 0, r = 0.707). The Bayes Factors is a ratio that contrasts the likelihood that 
the data would occur under the alternative (H1) versus null (H0) hypotheses, with values 
over 1 indicating support for H1 and values below 1 indicating support for the H0. Values 
close to 1 are only considered weakly/anecdotally supportive of one hypothesis over the 
other, whereas BF10 >3 are typically interpreted as substantial evidence in support of H
1 
over H0, and BF10 <0.33 are interpreted as substantial evidence in support of H
0 over H1 
(see Wagenmakers et al., 2011). 
The aIAT was developed to diagnose guilt or innocence at the individual level, 
which is typically done by classifying individuals with positive D-scores as “guilty” and 
individuals with negative D-scores as “innocent” when contrasting a guilty vs. innocent 
event in this way (Sartori et al., 2008). However, because such classification rates are 
dependent on choosing specific cut-offs and the optimal cut-off may vary across samples 
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and experimental designs, we instead conducted a threshold-independent receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis to evaluate classification performance using 
Areas Under the Curve (AUCs; following e.g. Hu et al., 2015, but see Supplementary 
Information for threshold-based classification). The AUCs reflect the accuracy with 
which a randomly chosen participant can be classified into the correct group (Guilty or 
Innocent), where .5 reflects chance classification and 1.0 reflects perfect classification. 
In addition to analysing the D-score, we also analysed the raw RT and accuracy 
rates separately for the guilt-congruent versus incongruent blocks for each group. 
However, since these analyses only revealed patterns that were consistent with the main 
D-score findings, they are presented in the supplementary file. Furthermore, in a final 
analysis, we also calculated a “faking index” (Agosta et al., 2011) that has been proposed 
as a method for detecting whether participants are showing unusual reaction time patterns 
that indicates countermeasure use. Therefore, we used the faking index to assess whether 
rehearsing a false alibi resulted in unusual reaction time patterns across aIAT blocks that 
could function as signals of guilt even when the main guilt measure (i.e. D-score) is 
disrupted by countermeasures. However, this analysis revealed that the faking index did 
not discriminate well between the groups, so these results are also presented in the 
supplementary file. Individual level data for this project is available at: 
https://osf.io/wumdy/  
Results 
Mean D-scores were in the expected direction, with the highest scores in the Guilty 
Standard group and the lowest scores in the Innocent group, and were significantly 
different between the three groups (F(2, 105) = 9.46, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15; Fig. 1). The 
innocent participants, who undertook the innocent act but did not have any knowledge of 
the mock crime, elicited D-scores below zero (t(35) = -2.48, p =.018, d = 0.41; BF10  
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=2.55). Guilty-Standard participants, who committed the mock crime but did not have any 
knowledge of the innocent act, elicited D-scores above zero (t(35) = 3.25, p =.003, d = 
0.54; BF10  =13.70). The Guilty-Alibi participants, who committed the mock crime and 
were also provided with an alibi scenario consistent with the innocent act, elicited D-
scores non-distinguishable from zero (t(35) = 0.17, p =.87, d = 0.03; BF10  =0.18). D-
scores were higher in the Guilty-Standard group than the Innocent group, strongly 
supported by both frequentist and Bayesian statistics (t(70) = 4.06, p < .001, d = 0.96; 
BF10  =179.99). However, there was only a non-significant trend for higher D-scores in 
the Guilty-Alibi compared to the Innocent group, and the Bayes Factor was very close to 
1 and thus inconclusive (t(70) = 1.80, p = .076, d = 0.43; BF10  =0.97). Importantly, D-
scores were significantly reduced in the Guilty-Alibi group compared to the Guilty-
Standard group, and the Bayes Factor indicated substantial evidence in favour of a 
difference (H1) compared to no difference (H0) between groups (t(70) = 2.66, p = .010, d 
= 0.62; BF10  = 4.55). These results indicate that, as expected, imagining a fake alibi 
consistent with innocence impaired memory detection with the aIAT.  
 




Figure 1. D-scores for the three groups from the Mock Crime/Innocent event aIAT in 
Experiment 1. Each dot indicates an individual score. The black lines shows the mean 
score and the grey boxes show the 95% confidence intervals of the mean. D-scores above 
zero suggest guilt (that the mock crime-related sentences are associated with the truth) 
and D-scores below zero suggest innocence (that the innocent-related sentences are 
associated with the truth). Scores are jittered along the x-direction for display purposes. 
 
 
Because applied uses of the aIAT involves classifying individual suspects as guilty or 
innocent, we also conducted a ROC analysis to evaluate how accurately our participants 
could be classified based on their D-scores. This analysis showed that when comparing 
Guilty-Standard and Innocent groups, D-score classification was significantly better than 
chance (AUC = .70, SE = .06, p = .004), but comparing Guilty-Alibi and Innocent groups, 
D-score classification was less accurate and not significantly different than chance (AUC 
= .62, SE = .07, p = .093). Thus, individual classification rates also supported our 
prediction that imagining a false alibi would impair memory detection. 
 
 
IMAGINING A FALSE ALIBI IMPAIRS MEMORY DETECTION 
 
17 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
In Experiment 1, the aIAT showed relatively good discrimination between guilt and 
innocence in participants who did not employ countermeasures, consistent with previous 
findings (e.g. Sartori, et al., 2008; Agosta & Sartori, 2013). However, the false alibi 
countermeasure reduced memory detection when compared to a standard guilty group who 
were not trying to evade the test, consistent with our predictions. Performance in the Innocent 
group showed a stronger relative association between the innocent act and the truth than the 
mock crime and the truth, whereas performance in the Guilty-Standard group indicated the 
opposite relative association. Performance in the Guilty-Alibi group however was equivocal 
as to which scenario was truthful. This pattern indicates that imagining a fake alibi scenario 
likely created a memory for the imagined  alibi act that had some implicit associations with 
the truth, even though participants knew their alibi was false at an explicit level (cf. 
Shidlovski, et al., 2014; Takarangi, Strange & Houghton, 2015; Takarangi, Strange, 
Shortland, & James, 2013). This account is consistent with more general findings that 
imagining an event can create a memory for that event that has similar perceptual and 
behavioural characteristics as memories based on true experiences (e.g. Loftus, 2003; Loftus 
& Pickrell, 1995; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009; Schacter, Guerin & St Jacques, 2011). 
Presumably, because both the mock crime and the imagined alibi act had some associations 
with the truth, neither of the critical aIAT blocks were truly congruent or incongruent with 
their memories, leading to similar performance in both blocks. 
 The results are consistent with the explanation that imagining a false alibi increased 
the implicit truth value of that scenario, which thereby disrupted aIAT discrimination 
between the alibi and the mock crime. However, imagining a counterfactual version of an 
event may also interfere with the veridical memory of the event and decrease its implicit truth 
value (cf. Otgaar & Baker, 2018). Gronau et al. (2015) asked participants to learn a 
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hypothetical crime scenario with various details that were different from a mock crime they 
had actually conduced. Results showed that learning a false version of the mock crime 
impaired explicit recall of true crime details, and furthermore, reduced skin-conductance 
markers of true crime memories. They argued that true crime memories may have become 
inhibited as a result of retrieval competition between true and false crime details, similarly to 
the retrieval-induced forgetting phenomenon (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994, 2000; 
Anderson & Levy, 2007), or alternatively, that the memory for alibi information interfered 
with and blocked access to the memory for the true mock crime (see Anderson & Neely, 
1996, for review). Because the aIAT in Experiment 1 measured the relative truth of the false 
alibi versus mock crime scenarios, we can conclude that these scenarios had similar implicit 
truth values in the alibi countermeasure group. However, we cannot determine whether the 
lack of a difference was due to increased implicit truth value of the false alibi, or reduced 
implicit truth value of the mock crime, or a combination of both. This issue was addressed in 
the next experiment. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 used exactly the same false alibi manipulation, materials and procedure as in 
Experiment 1, with the only change being that the final test involved a different aIAT design 
that contrasted the mock crime with an unexperienced event that was clearly different from 
the learned false alibi. Thus, this study investigated whether imagining a false alibi would 
still impair detection of the mock crime regardless of which other scenario it is compared to. 
If such a pattern was found, it would indicate that the implicit truth value of the original 
crime-related memory was weakened by rehearsing an alibi, since any reduction in mock 
crime detection in this aIAT could not be due to inflated implicit truth value of the imagined 
alibi event as this scenario was not used as a contrast in the test.  
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We hypothesised that if the alibi manipulation was successful at reducing the implicit 
truth value of the true mock crime memory, perhaps by reducing access to this memory 
through inhibition or an interference “blocking” mechanism (Anderson et al., 1994; Anderson 
& Levy, 2007; Gronau et al., 2015), then rehearsing an alibi should reduce detection of guilty 
suspects on the aIAT by lowering their D-scores when compared to guilty suspects who did 
not rehearse an alibi after committing the mock crime. As a consequence, the D-scores for 
guilty suspects who rehearsed an alibi should be more similar to the Innocent group than to 
the Guilty-Standard group. Alternatively, if our previous finding was caused only by an 
increase in implicit truth value of the alibi scenario due to an imagination inflation-related 
process (e.g. Loftus & Pickrell, 2995; Shidlovski et al., 2014), then there should be no 
difference in aIAT performance between the Guilty-Alibi and Guilty–Standard groups as 
guilt detection rates in both groups should be equal, but both groups should have higher D-




The final sample consisted of 108 undergraduate students from the University of Kent who 
took part via a research participation scheme in return for course credits (Mage = 18.94 years, 
SD = 1.98, age range = 18-36 years), maintaining the same statistical power as in Experiment 
1. Twelve additional participants were excluded due to technical errors or failures to follow 
instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to three experimental groups (N = 36 in 
each group): the Guilty-Alibi group (31 female and 5 male), the Guilty-Standard group (33 
female and 3 male), and the Innocent group (30 female and 6 male). The groups did not differ 
in age (F(2, 105) = 0.78, p = .461, ηp2 = 0.02), nor gender (χ2(2) = 1.15, p = .563, φ =  0.10). 
All participants had English as their first language, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
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and had no diagnosis of dyslexia. The study was approved by the University of Kent 
Psychology Ethics committee. 
 
Materials, design and procedure 
The materials, design and procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with one exception; the 
aIAT version was different. As in Experiment 1, the study was conducted in three stages. 
First, participants in the two guilty groups carried out a mock crime in which they required to 
go to an office block and steal a ring from a bag, whilst innocent participants carried out an 
innocent act, involving writing their email address on a paper in the same area as the guilty 
participants. Next, half of the guilty participants were instructed to imagine performing the 
innocent act as a fake alibi with the explicit intention to use it as a strategy to appear 
innocent. The rest of participants performed a filler task. Finally, all three groups took an 
aIAT, which assessed which of two events had a stronger relative association with the truth. 
Importantly, instead of contrasting the mock crime and innocent act/false alibi directly, the 
aIAT in Experiment 2 contrasted the mock crime with a completely novel unexperienced 
event involving entering a lecturer’s office and stealing a CD with exam questions on 
(henceforth referred to as the “exam” event, adapted from Sartori et al., 2008) that should not 
be associated with any truth value for any of the groups. All aspects of the aIAT task design 
and instructions were the same as in Experiment 1, with the only change being that sentences 
related to the alibi/innocent act were replaced with sentences related to the unexperienced 
event. As in Experiment 1, the order of the guilt congruent vs. incongruent blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants, and an equal number of participants within each group 
received each order. 
After the main experiment, all participants completed a questionnaire where they 
rated how they had experienced and conducted the different tasks. They rated how nervous 
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they had been while conducting the mock crime/innocent act (as applicable; on a 0-6 scale 
where 0 indicated not nervous at all; 6 extremely nervous), and how often they were thinking 
about the mock crime/innocent act during the aIAT (with 0 indicating not at all; 6 indicating 
all the time). The two guilty groups also rated their motivation to beat the aIAT (with 0 
indicating not motivated at all; 6 indicating extremely motivated), and answered open-ended 
questions on whether they used any strategy to intentionally distort the test. There were also 
two additional questions for guilty-alibi participants: how vividly they had been able to 
imagine the alibi (with 0 indicating not vivid at all; 6 indicating extremely vivid) and how 
often they were thinking about the alibi during the aIAT (with 0 indicating not at all; 6 
indicating all the time). 
 
Results 
The mean standardized D-score indices of guilt (Greenwald, et al., 2003; Hu et al., 2015) 
were significantly different between the groups (F(2, 105) = 6.73, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.11; see 
Figure 2). Innocent participants, who had no knowledge of neither the mock crime nor the 
novel “exam” event, obtained a D-score that was not significantly different from zero as 
expected, and the Bayes Factor showed relatively stronger evidence for no difference than 
a difference (t(35) = -0.57, p = .569, d = 0.10; BF10  =0.21). Guilty-Standard participants, 
who committed the mock crime and did not have any knowledge of the exam event, 
elicited D-scores significantly above zero, strongly supported by a very large Bayes 
Factor (t(35) = 4.10, p <.001, d = 0.68 BF10  =115.39). The Guilty-Alibi participants, who 
also committed the mock crime and did not have any knowledge about the exam event, 
also elicited D-scores significantly above zero, but with only anecdotal support for a 
difference from the Bayes Factor (t(35) = 2.28, p =.029, d = 0.38; BF10  =1.75). D-scores 
were significantly lower in the Innocent group than Guilty-Standard (t(70) = 3.59, p < 
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.001, d = 0.85; BF10  = 46.66) and Guilty-Alibi groups (t(70) = 2.06, p = .043, d = 0.49; 
BF10  =1.48). There was also a non-significant trend towards lower D-scores in the Guilty-
Alibi than Guilty-Standard group, but for this test the Bayes Factor was weakly more 
supportive of no group difference than a difference (t(70) = 1.67, p = .099, d = 0.39; BF10  
=0.80). These results indicate that imagining a false alibi does not abolish the implicit 
truth value of the true crime memory since the mean D-score was significantly above zero 
in the Guilty-Alibi group, and there was now only a weak, non-significant tendency, and 
no Baysian support for reduced aIAT memory detection in this group compared to the 




Figure 2. D-scores for the three groups from the Mock Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT 
in Experiment 2. The black lines shows the mean scores and the grey boxes show the 95% 
confidence intervals of the mean. D-scores above zero suggest guilt (that the ring-related 
sentences are associated with the truth). D-scores close to zero suggest that the events 
were equally associated with the truth, but because the test did not include a truly 
“innocent” event, innocence cannot be detected in this aIAT version.  
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A threshold-independent ROC analysis to evaluate classification performance 
showed that when comparing Guilty-Standard and Innocent groups, D-score classification 
was significantly better than chance (AUC = .73, SE = .06, p = .001). Comparing Guilty-
Alibi and Innocent groups, D-score classification was lower, but also better than chance 
(AUC = .64, SE = .07, p = .043). The D-score classification results thus indicated that 
rehearsing an alibi did not fully impair the original memory of the mock crime because 
these participants could still be detected as guilty, yet there was a subtle numerical 
reduction in guilt classification for Guilty-Alibi participants. 
 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire Analysis 
Ten participants (4 Innocent, 3 Guilty-standard and 3 Guilty-Alibi) were excluded from the 
questionnaire analysis due to missing responses. The results revealed no differences between 
Guilty-Standard (M = 2.76, SD = 1.60) and Guilty-Alibi (M = 2.60, SD = 1.46) groups in 
nervousness during the mock crime (t(64) = 0.40, p = .689, d = 0.10) and the extent to which 
they thought about the mock crime during the aIAT (M = 3.21, SD = 1.53; M = 3.52, SD = 
1.17, respectively; t(64) = 0.90, p = .372, d = 0.23). However, there was a significant 
difference between guilty groups in their motivation to beat the test: the Guilty-Alibi (M = 
4.15, SD = 1.18) group was more motivated to appear innocent than the Guilty-Standard 
group (M = 3.45, SD = 1.35; t(62) = 2.24, p = .029, d = 0.56). The Innocent group reported 
being significantly less nervous while conducting the innocent task than the Guilty groups 
were while conducting the mock crime (Innocent M = 1.78, SD = 1.60; Innocent vs. Guilty-
Alibi: (t(63) = 2.17, p = .033, d = 0.55; Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard: (t(63) = 2.46, p = .017, 
d = 0.62). They also thought less about the innocent act during the aIAT than the two Guilty 
groups thought about the mock crime during the aIAT (Innocent M = 1.00, SD = 1.50; 
Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: (t(63) = 7.53, p < .001, d = 1.90; Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard: 
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(t(63) = 5.87, p < .001, d = 1.48), as would be expected since there were no sentences related 
to the innocent act in this aIAT version. Exploratory correlation analyses were also conducted 
to investigate whether any of the self-report measures correlated with performance in the 
aIAT, but there were no significant correlations.  
Experiment 2 Discussion 
Experiment 2 assessed whether imagining a false alibi reduces the implicit truth value of the 
true crime memory, in line with previous findings that have shown that learning 
counterfactual details after a mock crime can impair true memories of the crime (Gronau, et 
al., 2015). In Experiment 1, the results showed that the aIAT was unable to determine 
whether an experienced mock crime or an imagined false alibi was true. However, the aIAT 
design did not permit us to test whether this lack of discrimination was caused by increased 
truth value of the imagined alibi or decreased truth value of the mock crime, or a combination 
of both. In Experiment 2, we therefore contrasted the mock crime with a novel event that had 
been neither experienced nor imagined in an aIAT, in order to assess the implicit truth value 
of the mock crime memory independent of the alibi memory. In this study, the mock crime 
was still detected despite participants previously imagining a false alibi, suggesting that the 
alibi had not impaired the true memory of the crime to a substantial extent. 
As expected in Experiment 2, the mean D-score of innocent participants was close to 
zero, suggesting that neither event was strongly associated with the truth in this group. Both 
guilty groups scored above zero, indicating that they associated the mock crime with the truth 
more than the unexperienced event. Therefore, it appears that the low discrimination between 
the experienced mock crime and imagined alibi in Experiment 1 was mainly driven by the 
alibi manipulation increasing the implicit truth value of the imagined scenario, rather than a 
reduction of implicit truth value of the mock crime memory. This finding contrasts with other 
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research that has suggested that rehearsing a false alibi can cause it to become a default 
response such that when a cue triggers a memory about a crime, that memory is automatically 
inhibited to facilitate a false alibi response (Foerster et al, 2017), and that thinking 
counterfactually can impair memories for the event that actually occurred (Petrocelli & 
Crysel, 2009; see also Otgaar and Baker, 2018). 
One possible reason why the true mock crime memory was unimpaired in Experiment 
2 might be that the alibi manipulation was only implemented through one brief rehearsal and 
imagination phase. Thus, the effect of the alibi manipulation may not have been as strong as 
in real life situations where suspects may prepare and imagine an alibi repeatedly and over a 
long-time period before the interrogation. If participants were able to rehearse/imagine the 
alibi in this way, it may be more likely to impair the true memory of the mock crime, either 
by increased retroactive interference or by inhibition of the crime memory representation 
itself (e.g. Gronau et al., 2015). Previous research has suggested that when multiple 
memories are associated to the same cue, repeatedly retrieving one memory in the face of 
competitive activation of another memory can cause the non-selected memory to become 
inhibited (Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994). Likewise, repeatedly pushing an unwanted 
memory out of mind by thinking of a substitute thought may interfere with (Bergström et al., 
2009) retrieval of the original memory, or even inhibit it (Anderson & Benoit, 2012). The 
literature on motivated forgetting suggests that such impairments of unwanted memories are 
gradual and increase with repetition (e.g. Anderson & Green, 2001), predicting that a true 
crime memory might only become impaired if a false alibi is repeatedly retrieved. Likewise, 
the retroactive interference theory suggests that repeatedly rehearsing one memory associated 
to a cue may strengthen that association, which can block access to other associated 
memories without those memories being inhibited (see Anderson & Neely, 1996). Thus, 
multiple theoretical accounts suggest that repeated and temporally extended imagination of 
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an alibi should be more likely to impair access to the original crime memory, as addressed in 
the next experiment. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to replicate and extend on findings from the previous studies, 
with particular focus on whether repeated rehearsal of a false alibi over an extended time 
period might be more effective at impairing the true memories compared to a single brief 
alibi intervention just before the aIAT. In the previous two experiments all experimental 
phases were conducted in the same session; participants first conducted a mock crime, then 
immediately learned and imagined the false alibi, which was followed by the aIAT. We 
therefore added a time delay of one week between the mock crime and test, which made the 
design more realistic and enabled us to investigate the effect of repeated and distributed false 
alibi rehearsal on aIAT memory detection. 
 The experimental design was similar to the previous studies, except that it was 
conducted in two sessions one week apart, and included an additional experimental group. 
Furthermore, in the second session, all participants completed three versions of the aIAT that 
contrasted the mock crime vs. the innocent/alibi event (same aIAT as in Experiment 1), the 
mock crime vs. an unexperienced event (same aIAT as in Experiment 2), and the alibi vs. the 
unexperienced event (a new aIAT version to assess the implicit truth value of the innocent 
act/alibi independently of the mock crime). Similarly to previous experiments, participants 
first conducted either an innocent act or a mock crime, depending on which group they were 
assigned to.  All participants then came back for the aIAT session a week later. In one 
countermeasure group (“Guilty-Alibi”), participants conducted a mock crime during the first 
session, then left and returned a week later at which point they learned and imagined the false 
alibi immediately before the aIATs. In the other countermeasure group (“Guilty-Alibi with 
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home training”), participants learned and imagined the false alibi during the first session 
immediately after conducting the mock crime, and were also required to repeat this 
imagination task at home once a day for a week before returning to complete the aIATs. 
These two countermeasure groups were compared against Innocent and Guilty-Standard 
groups, as in the previous two studies. 
 We expected that participants who carried out an innocent act should be detected as 
innocent and participants who committed a mock crime without learning an alibi should be 
detected as a guilty across the relevant aIAT versions. However, participants who learned the 
false alibi would be less likely to be detected as guilty than the standard guilty group. If 
imagining a false alibi leads to gradual strengthening of the false alibi information in memory 
and/or gradual impairment of the true memory with repetition, then extended rehearsal of a 
false alibi for a week before the test should be particularly effective at reducing detection of 




The final sample consisted of 144 undergraduate students from the University of Kent who 
took part via a research participation scheme in return for course credits (Mage = 19.13 year, 
SD = 1.57, age range = 18-34 years). Twenty-eight additional participants were excluded due 
to technical errors, failures to follow instructions, or failure to attend both sessions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups (N = 36 in each group): 
Innocent (30 female, 6 male), Guilty-Standard (30 female, 6 male), Guilty-Alibi (27 female, 
9 male), and Guilty-Alibi with Home Training (HT; 31 female, 5 male). Thus, this 
experiment maintained the same statistical power as the previous two experiments for 
pairwise comparisons between groups. The groups did not differ in terms of age (F(3,140) = 
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0.74, p = .531, ηp2 = .02) nor gender (χ2(3) = 1.69, p = .639, φ = 0.11). All participants had 
English as their first language, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and had no 
diagnosis of dyslexia. The study was approved by the University of Kent Psychology Ethics 
committee. 
 
Materials, Design, and Procedure 
First, participants in all three Guilty groups committed a mock crime involving going to a 
staff office area and stealing a ring, whereas participants in the Innocent group completed an 
innocent task involving writing their email address on a sign-up sheet in the same area (both 
these tasks were kept identical to Experiments 1 and 2). Next, all participants were dismissed 
and asked to come back to the laboratory after a week, except the Guilty-Alibi with HT 
group. The latter group were given instructions to perform an extra task after completing the 
mock crime. They first learned and imagined a false alibi, which described the innocent act, 
using the same materials and procedure as in Experiments 1 and 2. Next, they were given a 
home training task, which required them to access an internet link in order to rehearse the 
false alibi once every day in the intervening six days until the test day. When they accessed 
the link, they were asked to read a description of the alibi (using the same text as used on the 
first day) and imagine themselves completing the described actions as vividly and accurately 
as possible. After that, they were asked to write down a detailed description of the scenario 
they had imagined and rate how vivid their imagination of the alibi had been. Participants 
were only included in the final sample if they had completed this task as instructed. 
After a week, all participants came back to the lab to complete the rest of the study. 
Participants in Innocent and Guilty-Standard group were asked to complete a filler task 
(solving Sudoku puzzles), while the two Alibi groups rehearsed the alibi (describing the 
innocent act). For the Guilty-Alibi group, this was the first time they learned that they needed 
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to use an alibi to appear innocent and found out the details of the alibi/innocent act, whereas 
for the Guilty-Alibi with HT group it was another chance to rehearse the alibi they had 
learned and repeatedly rehearsed during the preceding week.  Finally, all participants 
completed three versions of the aIAT: 1) contrasting the mock crime vs. the innocent/alibi 
event (same aIAT as in Experiment 1); 2) contrasting the mock crime vs. the unexperienced 
event involving stealing an exam (same aIAT as in Experiment 2); and 3) contrasting the 
innocent/alibi vs. the unexperienced event (a novel aIAT version used to assess whether the 
innocent event would be detected as true after rehearsing a false alibi). The aIAT task design, 
sentences and instructions were identical to those used in the previous studies, with the only 
changes being the added new version 3, and that all participants undertook all three versions. 
The order of aIAT congruent/incongruent blocks and order of versions was fully 
counterbalanced across participants to prevent order effect confounds, and counterbalancing 
formats were equally distributed within each of the four groups. 
After the experiment, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire, which was 
similar to the one used in Experiment 2 with a few additional questions about details of the 
innocent act or mock crime. For the Innocent group, participants were required to give 
answers relating to details of the innocent act and give ratings on a scale from 0 to 6 
regarding their behaviour and experience during the initial act and the aIAT (e.g. in how 
much detail they could remember the act, their motivation to beat the aIAT, and the extent to 
which they thought about the act during the aIAT). The Guilty groups were asked to provide 
answers regarding details of the mock crime and provide various ratings on a 0-6 scale 
regarding their nervousness during the mock crime, their motivation to beat the aIAT, the 
extent to which they thought about the mock crime during the aIAT, and whether they had 
intentionally used any strategy to distort the test, including the extent to which they thought 
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about the alibi scenario during the aIAT and how vividly they had imagined an alibi (for the 
Guilty Alibi groups only). 
 
Results 
Mock Crime/Innocent event aIAT 
The Mock Crime/Innocent version of the aIAT directly contrasted the mock crime (ring) with 
the innocent/alibi (email) event, and was identical to the aIAT used in Experiment 1. In this 
test, positive D-scores (Greenwald, 2003; Hu et al., 2015) are indicative of guilt because they 
suggest participants associate the mock crime with the truth whereas negative D-scores are 
indicative of innocence because they suggest participants associate the innocent event with 
the truth. The mean D-scores were significantly different between the groups (F(3, 140) = 
6.78, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13; see Figure 3). The mean D-score of the Innocent group was not 
significantly different from zero, with the Bayes Factor indicating (weak) relative support of 
no difference over a difference (t(35) = -1.30, p = .20, d = 0.22; BF10  =0.39), inconsistent 
with the predictions and suggesting that the innocent event was on average not detected as 
true in this group. The Guilty-Standard group however did obtain a D-score that was 
significantly above zero with strong supporting evidence from the Bayes Factor (t(35) = 3.75, 
p < .001, d = 0.63; BF10  =47.32) indicating successful guilt detection in this group. The 
Guilty-Alibi group who committed a mock crime and learned a false alibi just prior to the test 
however had a mean score significantly below zero (t(35) = -2.06, p = .047, d = 0.34; BF10  
=1.18), thus appearing more innocent than guilty, although the Bayes Factor was only weakly 
supportive of a difference from zero in this group. In contrast, the Guilty-Alibi with HT 
group, who committed a mock crime and then repeatedly rehearsed a false alibi for a week 
before the test, did not have a mean D-score that differed from zero (t(35) = 1.01, p = .320, d 
= 0.17; BF10  = 0.29). Independent t-tests revealed that the mean D-score of the Innocent 
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group was significantly lower than in the Guilty-Standard group (t(70) = 3.54, p < .001, d = 
0.83; BF10  = 40.34), while there were no differences between the Innocent and either of the 
Alibi groups (Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 0.54, p = .59, d = 0.13, BF10  =0.28; Innocent 
vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT: t(70) = 1.64, p = .10, d = 0.39; BF10  =0.76). However, the mean D-
score of the Guilty-Standard group was significantly higher than in the Guilty-Alibi group, 
with strong support for a difference from the Bayes Factor (t(70) = 4.08, p < 0.001, d = 0.96; 
BF10  =194.05), but only trend level higher than in the Guilty-Alibi with HT group with only 
anecdotal Bayesian support for a difference (t(70) = 1.95, p = .056, d = 0.46; BF10  =1.21). 
Surprisingly, the mean D-score of the Guilty-Alibi with HT group was significantly higher 
than the Guilty-Alibi group with anecdotal Bayesian support for a difference between the two 
alibi groups (t(70) = 2.19, p = 0.03, d = 0.52; BF10  = 1.84), suggesting that extended training 
with the alibi actually made it a less effective strategy for appearing innocent on this aIAT 
version. 
 
Figure 3. D-scores for the four groups from the Mock Crime/Innocent event aIAT in 
Experiment 3. The black lines shows the mean score and the grey boxes show the 95% 
confidence intervals of the mean. D-scores above zero suggest guilt (that the ring-related 
sentences are associated with the truth) and D-scores below zero suggest innocence (that the 
email-related sentences are associated with the truth).  
 




A threshold-independent ROC analysis to evaluate classification performance showed that 
when comparing Innocent and Guilty-Standard groups, D-score classification was 
significantly better than chance (AUC = .72, SE = .060, p = .001). However, D-score 
classification was not accurate when comparing Innocent and Guilty-Alibi groups (AUC = 
.54, SE = .069, p = .581), nor when comparing Innocent and Guilty-Alibi with HT groups, 
although the latter was at trend-level (AUC = .62, SE = .067, p = .073).  
So in sum, the Mock Crime/Innocent aIAT largely replicated the findings from 
Experiment 1; guilty participants who did not use countermeasures could be detected as 
guilty, whereas imagining a false alibi led to lower detection rates. However, this 
countermeasure was most effective when applied only once immediately before the aIAT, 
contrary to our predictions that extended and repeated alibi rehearsal would enhance the 
effectiveness of this strategy. Also somewhat surprising was that detection of innocent 
participants was relatively poor compared to Experiment 1. 
 
Mock Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT 
The Mock Crime/Unexperienced event version of the aIAT contrasted the mock crime (ring) 
with an event that none of the groups had experience nor knowledge of (exam), and was 
identical to the aIAT version used in Experiment 2. In this test, positive D-scores are 
indicative of guilt because they suggest that participants associate the mock crime with the 
truth, whereas D-scores around zero suggest that participants associate both events equally 
strongly with the truth (i.e. they associate either both, or neither event with the truth). 
Because none of the two events is indicative of innocence there is no result that would be 
diagnostic of innocence in this aIAT version, and no groups were predicted to show negative 
D-scores. In this test, there was only a trend towards differences between the groups in mean 
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D-scores (F(3, 140) = 2.50, p = .062, ηp2 = 0.05; see Figure 4), suggesting that this aIAT 
version did not discriminate between the groups as well as the Mock Crime/Innocent event 
aIAT (as would be expected since there should be less variability between groups when the 
test is designed to only produce scores either around zero or above, and no negative scores). 
The mean D-scores of Guilty-Standard (t(35) = 3.99, p < .001, d = 0.67; BF10  =87.79) and 
Guilty-Alibi with HT group (t(35) = 3.07, p = .004, d = 0.51; BF10  =8.97) were significantly 
above zero, supported by large Bayes Factors. However, the mean D-scores for Innocent 
(t(35) = -0.17, p = .868, d = 0.03; BF10  =0.18) and Guilty-Alibi groups (t(35) = 1.91, p = 
.064, d = 0.32; BF10  =0.91) were not significantly different from zero, with the Bayesian 
evidence more in favour of no difference than a difference. Independent t-tests revealed that 
the mean D-score of the Innocent group was significantly lower than in the Guilty-Standard 
group (t(70) =2.59, p = .01, d =0.61; BF10  =4.04) and the Guilty-Alibi with HT groups (t(70) 
=2.19, p = .03, d =0.52; BF10  =1.84), however no significant differences between the groups 
emerged from the other pairwise comparisons (Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) =1.49, p = 
.14, d =0.35, BF10  =0.63; Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) =0.89, p = .38, d =0.21, 
BF10  =0.34; Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT: t(70) =0.27, p = .79, d =0.06, BF10  
=0.25; Guilty-Alibi vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT: t(70) =0.61, p = .55, d =0.14, BF10  =0.29). 




Figure 4. D-scores for the four groups from the Mock Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT in 
Experiment 3. The black lines shows the mean score and the grey boxes show the 95% 
confidence intervals of the mean. D-scores above zero suggest guilt (that the ring-related 
sentences are associated with the truth). D-scores close to zero suggest that the events were 
equally associated with the truth, but because the test did not include a truly “innocent” event, 
innocence cannot be classified in this aIAT version.  
 
 
Threshold independent ROC analyses showed that D-score classification performance was 
above chance when comparing the Innocent and Guilty-Standard groups (AUC = .68, SE = 
.064, p = .009) and when comparing the Innocent and Guilty-Alibi with HT groups (AUC = 
.62, SE = .065, p = .037). However, classification performance was not accurate when 
comparing the Innocent and Guilty-Alibi groups (AUC = .59, SE = .068, p = .207).  
To summarise, results of the Mock Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT in Experiment 3 
replicated the findings from Experiment 2 that guilty participants who did not use 
countermeasures could be detected as guilty when compared to an innocent group. Consistent 
with results from the Mock Crime/Innocent event version in Experiment 3, the Mock 
Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT also indicated that whereas the Guilty-Alibi with HT group 
could be detected as guilty, the Guilty-Alibi group without home training appeared less guilty 
(they were not significantly different from the Innocent group in any analysis). This pattern 
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again suggests that the false alibi countermeasure was most effective when applied only once 
immediately before the aIAT, contrary to our predictions. However, the effects of the alibi 
manipulation were weaker on this version of the aIAT compared to the Mock Crime/Innocent 
event aIAT, since the Guilty-Alibi group did not show a significant reduction in D-score 
compared to the Guilty Standard group. Thus, consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, the alibi 
manipulation was most effective when the mock crime and alibi were directly contrasted, and 
was less effective when the mock crime was contrasted with an unexperienced event.  
 
Innocent/Unexperienced event aIAT 
The Innocent/Unexperienced event version of the aIAT contrasted the innocent/alibi event 
(involving writing an email) with an event that none of the groups had experience nor 
knowledge of (stealing an exam) in order to assess whether the innocent/alibi event would be 
detected as true for any of the groups. That is, would learning and rehearsing a false alibi lead 
that scenario to be detected as true, or would it only be detected as true for the Innocent group 
who had actually conducted the act? In this test, positive D-scores are indicative of innocence 
because they suggest that participants associate the email event with the truth, whereas D-
scores around zero suggest that participants associate both events equally strongly with the 
truth (i.e. they associate either both, or neither event with the truth). Because neither of the 
two events is indicative of guilt there is no result that would be diagnostic of guilt in this 
aIAT version, and no groups were predicted to show negative D-scores. In this test, the mean 
D-score of the Guilty-Standard group was not different from zero (t(35) = 0.09, p = .928, d = 
0.02; BF10  =0.18) as expected, since this group had no knowledge of either event. In contrast, 
the Guilty-Alibi (t(35) = 2.28, p = .029, d = 0.38; BF10  =1.73) and Guilty-Alibi with HT 
groups (t(35) = 2.23, p = .033, d = 0.37; BF10  =1.58) did score significantly above zero, 
suggesting that the alibi was detected as if true on average in these groups (although with 
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only weak support from the Bayes Factor). Surprisingly however, the Innocent group’s mean 
D-score was not significantly above zero and the Bayes Factor indicated relative support for 
no difference from zero (t(35) = 0.40, p = .687, d = 0.07; BF10  =0.19), showing a failure of 
the test to detect the innocent event even though it was actually true for that group. There was 
also no overall significant difference between the groups in mean D-scores (F(3, 140) = 1.95, 
p = .124, ηp2 = 0.04; see Figure 5), suggesting that this aIAT version did not discriminate 
between the groups well. Comparing differences in mean D-score between groups using 
independent t-tests, there were non-significant trends towards more positive D-scores in the 
two Alibi groups than in the Guilty-Standard group (Guilty-Alibi vs. Guilty-Standard: t(70) 
=1.81, p = .08, d =0.43, BF10  =0.98; Guilty-Alibi with HT vs. Guilty-Standard: t(70) =1.79, p 
= .08, d =0.42; BF10  =0.95) but none of the other differences approached significance and the 
Bayesian analysis indicated relatively more support for no difference than a difference for all 
comparisons (Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard: t(70) =0.37 p = .72, d =0.09, BF10  =0.26; 
Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) =1.36, p = .18, d =0.32, BF10  =0.54; Innocent vs. Guilty-
Alibi with HT: t(70) =1.35, p = .18, d =0.32, BF10  =0.53; Guilty-Alibi vs. Guilty-Alibi with 
HT: t(70) =0.01, p = .99, d <0.01,BF10  =0.24). 
 




Figure 5. D-scores for the four groups from the Innocent/Unexperienced event aIAT in 
Experiment 3. The black lines shows the mean score and the grey boxes show the 95% 
confidence intervals of the mean. D-scores above zero suggest innocence (that the email-
related sentences are associated with the truth). D-scores close to zero suggest that the events 
were equally associated with the truth, but because the test did not include a truly “guilty” 
event, guilt cannot be classified in this aIAT version.  
 
 
Threshold-independent ROC analyses revealed that D-score classification based on the 
Innocent/Unexperienced event aIAT was inaccurate. Comparing the Innocent group with the 
Guilty-Standard group, classification performance was at chance (AUC = .52, SE = .069, p = 
.787), and it was only slightly better but still not significant when comparing Innocent 
participants to Guilty-Alibi (AUC = .59, SE = .067, p = .177) and Guilty-Alibi with HT (AUC 
= .59, SE = .068, p = .169).  
Thus, in this aIAT version, we found very poor detection of the participants who had 
actually performed the innocent act, whereas imagining a false alibi seemed to have slightly 
increased detection of this false scenario as true in the two Alibi groups. However, since the 
groups were not significantly different from each other in mean D-scores or classification 
rates, this slight increase in the Alibi groups was not reliable.  




Post-Experiment Questionnaire  
Results from the final questionnaire are shown in Table 1. The Innocent group rated their 
memory of the innocent act as less vivid than the three Guilty groups rated their memory for 
the mock crime act (Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard: t(70) = 3.46, p = .001, d = 0.83; Innocent 
vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 3.39, p = .001, d = 0.81; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT: t(70) = 
4.45, p < .001, d = 1.06) and they also reported that they remembered fewer details of the act 
(Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard: (t(70) = 4.42, p < .001, d = 1.06; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: 
t(70) = 5.20, p < .001, d = 1.24; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT: t(70) = 4.93, p < .001, d = 
1.18).  The Innocent group also reported having been less nervous during the innocent act 
than the three Guilty groups were when they committed the mock crime (Innocent vs. Guilty-
Standard: t(70) = 2.80, p = .007, d = 0.67; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 2.13, p = .037, d 
= 0.51; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT: t(70) = 3.83, p < .001, d =0.92), and reported 
thinking about the innocent act less during the aIATs than the three Guilty groups thought 
about the mock crime during the aIATs (Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard: t(70) = 3.85, p < .001, 
d = 0.92; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 2.13, p = .037, d = 0.51; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi  
 with HT: t(70) = 3.95, p < .001, d = 0.94). There were no significant differences between the 
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 Table 1. Mean and standard deviations of self-reported ratings on the final questionnaire for 
the four groups. The scale had seven points (0-6), and lower scores always indicate less of the 
item being measured (e.g. less vividness/nervousness/motivation, etc.) and higher scores 
always indicate more of the item being measured (e.g. more vividness/nervousness/ 
motivation, etc.). 
 
Note: the “act” refers to the act conducted in the first session (i.e. either mock crime or 
innocent act, depending on group). 
 
The Alibi groups and the Innocent group were all more motivated to appear innocent on the 
aIATs than the Guilty-Standard group (Guilty-Standard vs. Innocent: t(70) =2.04, p = .045, d 
= 0.49; Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) =3.09, p = .003, d = 0.74; Guilty-Standard vs. 
Guilty-Alibi with HT: t(70) = 2.83, p =.006, d = 0.68), but did not differ between each other 
in levels of motivation (all ps >0.39). With regards to the alibi-specific questions, there were 
no differences between the Albi groups in terms of how much they were thinking of the alibi 
during the aIATs (t(70) = 0.75, p =.46, d = 0.18), but the Guilty-Alibi with HT group 
reported being able to imagine the alibi scenario in more details (t(70) = 2.48, p =.016, d = 
0.59) and more vividly than the Guilty-Alibi group (t(70) = 2.36, p =.021, d = 0.56). 
Exploratory correlation analyses were also conducted to investigate whether any of the self-
report measures correlated with performance in the aIAT, but there were no significant 
correlations. 
 So in sum, the questionnaire data from Experiment 3 suggested that the Innocent 
group had poorer memory of the innocent act than the Guilty groups’ memory of the mock 
crime, whereas repeated and extended rehearsal of the alibi scenario in the Guilty-Alibi with 







Remember detail of the act 3.39 (1.25) 4.64 (0.72) 4.64 (0.87) 4.53 (0.91) 
Vividness of the act memory 3.50 (1.76) 4.36 (0.83) 4.69 (0.98) 4.44 (1.03) 
Nervousness during the act 1.67 (1.29) 2.33 (1.37) 3.05 (1.76) 2.69 (1.79) 
Thinking about the act during aIAT 1.58 (1.56) 2.50 (1.68) 3.11 (1.71) 3.08 (1.75) 
Motivation to beat the aIAT 3.86 (1.50) 4.14 (1.22) 4.14 (1.50) 3.11 (1.58) 
Imagine detail of the alibi - 3.94 (1.33) 4.57 (0.70) - 
Vividness of the alibi imagination - 3.89 (1.47) 4.57 (0.88) - 
Thinking about the alibi during aIAT - 2.83 (1.68) 3.14 (1.78) - 
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HT group led to improved ability to imagine the alibi scenario when compared to the Guilty-
Alibi group. Furthermore, the Innocent and Alibi groups were more motivated to appear 
innocent on the aIATs than the Guilty-Standard group. 
 
Experiment 3 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to further investigate the effect of rehearsing alibi as a 
countermeasure on the aIAT (Agosta & Sartori, 2013; Sartori et al., 2008). Previous research 
suggested that rehearsing an counterfactual scenario to what actually happened during a 
mock crime can impair access to the true memory (Gronau et al., 2015). In Experiment 3, we 
investigated whether learning and imagining a false alibi prior to the aIAT would impair the 
original memory for a mock crime and/or increase the implicit truth value of the alibi itself, 
and whether these effects would be particularly enhanced when the alibi was repeatedly 
rehearsed and imagined over an extended time period, in line with theoretical accounts of 
retrieval interference and inhibition (see e.g. Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & 
Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson & Neely, 1996). Such extended and repeated practice of an alibi 
might be expected to occur in real life, since a guilty criminal might adopt a false alibi and 
then practice it extensively prior to an investigation several days, weeks or months later.  
The results indicated that in the aIAT that tested the relative strength of the mock 
crime vs. innocent act/alibi, the mock crime was possible to detect after a week delay in 
Guilty-Standard participants. However, this aIAT could not distinguish which of the two 
events were true for Innocent participants, nor for the Guilty-Alibi with HT groups. 
Interestingly, in the Guilty-Alibi group that did not receive home training, the test result was 
more indicative of innocence than guilt. In the aIAT that tested the relative strength of the 
mock crime vs. an unexperienced event, results suggested that the mock crime was possible 
to detect in Guilty-Standard and Guilty-Alibi with HT groups, while it was undetectable in 
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Innocent and Guilty-Alibi groups. In the aIAT that tested the relative strength of the 
innocent/alibi act vs. an unexperienced event, none of the groups showed strong evidence of 
innocence and this aIAT showed poor discrimination between all groups.  
Our findings thus indicate that the strongest effect of the alibi countermeasure was in 
the Guilty-Alibi participants who learned and imagined a fabricated alibi one week after the 
mock crime and just prior to the test, without repeated rehearsal. In this group, the results 
suggested that they associated the imagined false alibi event more with the truth relative to 
the objectively true mock crime event. Moreover, the aIAT that contrasted the mock crime 
with an unexperienced event was not able to distinguish which of the two events was true for 
these guilty participants, suggesting that access to the mock crime memories may have been 
impaired in this group. Thus, the effect of the alibi countermeasure in this group was even 
stronger than the findings in Experiments 1 and 2, where the alibi group did not show 
significant associations between the alibi and truth (Experiment 1) and they also showed 
evidence of associating the mock crime with truth when contrasted with the unexperienced 
event (Experiment 2). These differences across studies may be due to differences in the 
relative strength of the memory representations for the alibi information versus the mock 
crime. Mental simulation of the alibi event just before the aIAT may have caused this 
imagined event memory to be more vivid or salient than the true memory of the mock crime, 
which may have been weaker in this experiment than in the previous two studies due to the 
longer time delay between the event and the test. Because of the relatively weak memory for 
the mock crime, the alibi countermeasure may have been more effective at obscuring 
detection of that memory than in the previous two studies (cf. Gronau et al., 2015, for related 
findings with psychophysiological memory detection). 
Surprisingly, a different result pattern was observed in the guilty participants who 
received repeated alibi training for a week before the aIATs. We predicted that extended 
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rehearsal of an imagined alibi would be particularly effective at inducing blocking by 
retroactive interference or competitive inhibition of the true memory (e.g. Anderson & 
Hanslmayr, 2014, Anderson & Neeley, 1996), and that this group would therefore be more 
likely to appear innocent compared to a group who only imagined the alibi once just before 
the test. However, we found the opposite result – although the extended alibi training did 
reduce memory detection on the aIAT version that directly contrasted the mock crime with 
the alibi, the magnitude of this reduction was smaller than in the alibi group without extended 
training. Furthermore, in the aIAT version that contrasted the mock crime with an 
unexperienced event, the mock crime was still detected as true in the extended training group. 
These results suggest that extensive and repeated rehearsal of the false alibi did not impair the 
original mock crime memory, rather, it may have actually strengthened that memory. The 
home training task may have had an ironic effect of reminding participants of the mock crime 
and leading the memory for the crime to become strengthened as a result, consistent with 
prior findings that repeated reminders can enhance automatic influences of memories, which 
can produce ironic effects when such enhancement affects behaviour in unwanted ways 
(Jacoby, 1999). Future research should assess whether alibi-induced ironic strengthening of 
the true crime memory can be avoided by explicitly training participants to suppress thoughts 
of the mock crime while completing the alibi imagination task, which might be an effective 
strategy for reducing mock crime memory strength whilst simultaneously strengthening 
memory for the alibi (cf. Anderson & Green, 2001; Bergström et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2015). 
Another surprising finding in Experiment 3 was that none of the aIAT versions 
detected the innocent act as true for participants in the Innocent group despite them actually 
having conducted the act in real life. In contrast, the mock crime could be detected in the 
guilty participants who did not use countermeasures. This difference may be related to the 
one week delay that we introduced between the initial act and the aIATs, which may have 
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weakened innocent participants’ memory of the innocent act more than it weakened guilty 
participants’ memory of the mock crime. In line with this suggestion, the innocent 
participants rated their memories of their act as less vivid and detailed than the guilty 
participants’ ratings of the mock crime memories, and also reported that they had been less 
nervous while conducting the act than the guilty participants were when conducting the mock 
crime. This pattern of results suggest that the mock crime memories were associated with 
higher emotional arousal, which is known to enhance the subjective vividness of memories 
and their durability over time (Kensinger, 2009). This finding is interesting as it converges 
with other evidence that memories of recent, familiar events are more detectable in the aIAT 
than memories of distant, less familiar events (Takarangi et al., 2015) in pointing towards a 
role of subjective memory quality in aIAT accuracy – the test may only be able to detect 
memories that are subjectively detailed and vivid, and any factors that reduce memory quality 
may also reduce the test’s effectiveness. It also suggests general limitations with laboratory 
studies that investigate memory detection with mock crimes, since memories of mock crimes 
may differ substantially from real criminal memories in terms of emotional arousal. Future 
research should investigate whether countermeasures can be used against aIAT memory 
detection of real autobiographical memories that are emotionally arousing. 
Overall, the results of Experiment 3 support our hypothesis that rehearsing a false 
alibi before an aIAT may distort the test results, but they also show that the effectiveness of 




The aIAT has been promoted as an accurate tool for determining which of two 
autobiographical events are true, with promising applications in forensic memory detection 
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(Sartori et al., 2008; Agosta & Sartori, 2013). However, a growing body of research has 
revealed potential countermeasures that guilty suspects can adopt to make themselves appear 
innocent, such as intentionally altering their responses during the test itself (Agosta et al., 
2011; Hu et al., 2012; Verschuere et al., 2009), or suppressing their incriminating memories 
in advance of the test (Hu et al., 2015). We tested whether a novel countermeasure that has 
recently been applied in physiological memory detection (Gronau et al., 2015) and deception 
detection paradigms (Foerster et al., 2017; Suchotzki et al., 2018) would also be effective at 
reducing detection using the aIAT. Specifically, we assessed whether instructing guilty 
suspects to intentionally store false information in memory would enable those suspects to 
appear innocent on the test. In line with our predictions, imagining a false alibi impaired 
memory detection with the aIAT so that the test could no longer distinguish between the 
objectively true mock crime memory and the objectively false alibi, and this finding was 
replicated with a large effect size in two experiments. Consistent with previous research (e.g. 
Sartori et al., 2008, Agosta & Sartori, 2013), our results showed relatively good 
discrimination between guilt and innocence in participants who did not employ 
countermeasures. However, the false alibi countermeasure significantly reduced memory 
detection when compared to a standard guilty group who were not trying to evade the test.  
Across experiments, the strongest and most consistent effect of the alibi manipulation 
occurred on the aIAT version that directly contrasted the mock crime with the alibi to assess 
their relative truth value, whereas there were only weaker, less consistent effects on the aIAT 
that contrasted the mock crime with an unexperienced novel event to detect the truth value of 
the mock crime itself. This pattern indicates that the effectiveness of the alibi strategy was 
primarily driven by increased detection of the alibi as true, rather than decreased detection of 
the mock crime as true. Imagining a false alibi may have created a memory for the alibi 
scenario that had some implicit associations with the truth, even though participants knew 
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their alibi was false at an explicit level. This account converges with more general findings 
that imagining an event can create a memory for that event that has similar perceptual and 
behavioural characteristics as memories based on true experiences (e.g. Loftus, 2003; Loftus 
& Pickrell, 1995; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009; Schacter, Guerin & St Jacques, 2011), and 
previous findings that imagining simple actions can increase detection of those actions as true 
in the aIAT, either by inducing misremembering that imagined actions were actually 
performed (Takarangi et al., 2013) or sometimes even despite participants knowing the 
imagined action did not actually happen (Shidlovski, et al., 2014). 
Our findings thus converge with other research that have found dissociations between 
explicit and implicit measures of truth (Shidlovski, et al., 2014). It has been suggested that 
these dissociations occur because people can make contrary implicit and explicit evaluations 
of truth, which may help them deceive both themselves and others (Shidlovski et al., 2014). 
However, an alternative and more parsimonious explanation is that the aIAT does not 
actually measure implicit associations between events and the truth, but instead is simply 
sensitive to the relative salience of different events. In line with this view, asking participants 
to rehearse and imagine the alibi may have increased the relatively salience of this event 
compared to the mock crime or unexperienced event (cf. Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). 
Regardless of which account is correct, this uncertainty regarding what the aIAT measures is 
in our view a fundamental problem for using the aIAT in real criminal cases (see Sirgiovanni, 
et al., 2016) – if researchers do not know what the test is measuring, how can using the test 
be justified when a false result may have direct real life consequences? Clearly, practical 
applications of the aIAT are premature until further research has clarified what the test 
actually measures, and in what situations it will produce accurate results. 
Although our key finding that the false alibi countermeasure reduced the aIAT’s 
ability to discriminate between a true mock crime and a false alibi was strong and robust, our 
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sample sizes and designs were not optimized to detect more subtle changes in guilt detection 
between groups. For example, there were non-significant trends towards differences between 
groups in several other comparisons (e.g., alibi vs. innocent groups in Experiment. 1) that 
could have been informative if we had increased the statistical power of the design. Likewise, 
these other group comparisons sometimes produced inconclusive Bayes Factors that were not 
clearly supportive of the alternative nor the null hypothesis, which indicates that the sample 
sizes were too small to discriminate between these competing hypotheses using Bayesian 
analyses (see Lakens et al., 2018 for discussion). This limitation should be addressed by 
employing larger sample sizes in future research to better understand variations in truth 
detection of autobiographical events with the aIAT.   
 To conclude, we show that imagining a false alibi impaired memory detection with 
the aIAT since it was unable to distinguish between a true mock crime and a false alibi. This 
finding raises serious concerns for potential real life applications of this test as a forensic tool 
with lying, uncooperative suspects. In real life, guilty suspects may spontaneously fabricate 
false alibis, and investigators may want to use the aIAT to compare the truth value of a 
suspect’s alibi with the crime they are accused of. Our results suggest that such real life 
applications may be unsuccessful due to suspects inadvertently modifying their memories by 
fabricating a false alibi. Furthermore, memories of unethical behaviour such as crimes may 
be particularly susceptible to modification because forgetting immoral acts allow people to 
maintain a positive self-concept (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016; although see Stanley, Wang & De 
Brigard, 2018). Thus, guilty suspects may have several strong motivations to change their 
memories for self-serving reasons, which in turn may enable them to appear innocent on 
forensic memory detection tests. 
 




See supplemental file. 
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Reaction times and Accuracy 
As reported in the main paper, the key measure of aIAT performance is the D-score, 
which combines RT and accuracy into a standardized summary score. However, we also 
analysed these measures separately to gain further insight into exactly how the Alibi 
manipulation affected performance. 
 
Experiment 1 RT and Accuracy 
For RT (Fig. S1B), a 3 (Group) x 2 (Block) mixed ANOVA showed a significant 
interaction between Group and Block (F(2, 105) = 5.46,  p = .006, ηp2 = 0.09). However, 
there was no main effect of neither Block (F(1, 105) = 0.01, p = .932, ηp2 < 0.001), nor 
Group (F(2, 105) = 1.47, p = .234, ηp2 = .03). Follow-up paired t-tests showed no 
significant RT difference between guilt congruent and guilt incongruent blocks in the 
Guilty-Alibi group (t(35) = 0.47, p = .639, d = 0.08). The Innocent group had significant 
slower RTs in the guilt congruent than the guilt incongruent block (t(35) = 2.13, p = .040, 
d = 0.40), whereas the Guilty-Standard group showed the opposite pattern (t(35) = 2.27, p 
= .029, d = 0.47).  
 




Figure S1. Proportion accurate responses (A) and mean reaction time (B) from the 
Guilty-Incongruent (True+Email/False+Ring) and Guilty-Congruent 
(True+Ring/False+Email) blocks of the Mock Crime/Innocent event aIAT in Experiment 
1. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Comparing the groups directly within each block separately revealed that the 
Guilty-Standard group responded significantly faster than the Innocent group in the guilt 
congruent block (t(70) = 2.24, p = .028, d = 0.53) as predicted. The Guilty-Standard group 
also responded significantly faster than the Guilty-Alibi group in the guilt congruent 
block (t(70) = 2.46, p = .016, d = 0.58). However, there was no reaction time difference 
between Innocent and Guilty-Alibi group (t(70) = 0.12, p = .905, d = 0.03). There were no 
significant RT differences between the groups during the guilt incongruent block 
(Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 1.72, p = .09, d = 0.43; Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard: 
t(70) = 1.40, p = .16, d = 0.33; Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 0.25, p = .81, d = 
0.06). 
For accuracy (Fig S1A), a 3 (Group) x 2 (Block) mixed ANOVA showed a 
significant interaction between Group and Block (F(2, 105) = 3.65, p = .029, ηp2 = 0.07). 
However, there was no main effect of neither Block (F(1, 105) = 0.252, p = .617, ηp2 < 
0.001) nor Group (F(2, 105) = 3.02, p = .053, ηp2 = 0.05). Paired t-tests revealed no 
significant difference in accuracy between guilt congruent and guilt incongruent blocks in 
A B 
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the Innocent group (t(35) = 1.38, p = .176, d = 0.30), and Guilty-Alibi group (t(35) = 
0.04, p = .971, d = 0.01). However, the Guilty-Standard group were more accurate in the 
guilt congruent block than guilt incongruent block (t(35) = 2.09, p = .044, d = 0.41). 
 Comparing the groups directly within each block separately revealed that the 
Innocent group was significantly more accurate than the Guilty-Standard group in the 
guilt incongruent block, (t(70) = 2.77, p = .007, d = 0.67). The Guilty-Alibi group was 
also significantly more accurate than the Guilty-Standard group in the guilty-incongruent 
block (t(70) = 2.69, p =.009, d = 0.65). However, there was no difference between 
Innocent and Guilty-Alibi groups in the guilt incongruent block (t(70) = 0.19, p = .853, d 
= 0.04). There were no significant Accuracy differences between groups during the guilt 
congruent block (Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 1.20, p = .23, d = 0.28; Innocent vs. 
Guilty-Standard: t(70) = 0.28, p = .780, d = 0.07; Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) 
= 0.92, p = .360, d = 0.27). 
Thus, this analysis showed that raw reaction times and accuracy on the critical 
guilt congruent and incongruent blocks only distinguished between the Guilty-Standard 
and the other two groups, whereas there were no significant differences between the 
Guilty-Alibi and Innocent groups on either measure in either block. Therefore, Guilty-
Alibi participants managed to appear innocent also when analysing raw RTs and 
Accuracy separately in Experiment 1. 
 
Experiment 2 RT and Accuracy 
For RT (Fig. S2B), a 3 (group: Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi; between 
subjects) x 2 (block: congruent vs. incongruent; within subjects) mixed ANOVA showed 
a significant main effect of Block (F(1, 105) = 18.30, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15) and interaction 
between Group and Block (F(2, 105) = 6.98,  p = .001, ηp2 = 0.12). However, there was no 
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main effect of Group (F(2, 105) = 0.82, p = .443, ηp2 = 0.02). Follow-up paired t-tests 
showed significantly faster RTs in the guilt congruent than incongruent blocks for both 
Guilty-Alibi  (t(35) = 2.48, p = .018, d = 0.38) and Guilty-Standard groups (t(35) = 4.76, 
p < .001, d = 0.70), but no significant RT differences between blocks in the Innocent 
group (t(35) = 0.39, p = .699, d = 0.05).  
 
 
Figure S2. Mean response times (A) and proportion accurate responses (B) from the 
guilt-incongruent (True+Exam/False+Ring) and guilt-congruent 
(True+Ring/False+Exam) blocks of the Mock Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT in 
Experiment 2. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Comparing the groups directly within each block separately revealed that the 
Guilty-Standard group responded significant slower than the Innocent group in the guilt 
incongruent block (t(70) = 2.49, p = .015, d = 0.60), and there was a trend in the same 
direction for the Guilty-Alibi group compared to the Innocent group (t(70) = 1.81, p = 
.074, d = 0.43), but no significant RT differences between Guilty-Alibi vs. Guilty-
Standard groups in the guilt incongruent block(t(70) = 0.60, p = .552, d = 0.15). There 
were no significant RT differences between any groups during the guilt congruent block 
(Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 0.090, p = .929, d = 0.02; Innocent vs. Guilty-
A B 
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Standard: t(70) = 0.73, p = .468, d = 0.17; Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 0.82, 
p = .415, d = 0.20). 
For accuracy (Fig. S2A), a 3 (group: Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-
Alibi; between subjects) x 2 (block: congruent vs. incongruent; within subjects) mixed 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Block (F(1, 105) = 5.50, p = .021, ηp2 = .05). 
However, there was no main effect of Group (F(2, 105) = .812, p = .447, ηp2 = .02) and 
the interaction was at trend-level (F(2, 105) = 2.32, p = .104, ηp2 = .042). Paired t-tests 
revealed no significant difference in accuracy between guilt congruent and guilt 
incongruent blocks in the Innocent group (t(35) = 0.14, p = .890, d = 0.07), nor the 
Guilty-Alibi group (t(35) = 1.27, p = .211, d = 0.22). However, the Guilty-Standard group 
were more accurate in the guilt congruent block than guilt incongruent block (t(35) = 
2.46, p = .019, d = 0.57). 
 Comparing the groups directly within each block separately revealed that the 
Guilty-Standard group was significantly less accurate than the Innocent group in the 
guilty incongruent block, but there were no other group differences in that block 
(Innocent group vs. Guilty-Standard group: t(70) = 2.13, p = .037, d = 0.51; Guilty-Alibi 
vs. Guilty-Standard: t(70) = 1.21, p = .229, d = 0.29; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 
0.76, p = .450, d = 0.18). There were also no significant accuracy differences between 
groups during the guilt congruent block (Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = .396, p = .693, 
d = 0.09; Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard: t(70) = 0.60, p = .548, d = 0.14; Guilty-Standard 
vs. Guilty-Alibi: t(70) = 0.08, p = .936, d = 0.02).  
Thus, these results suggest suggests that in Experiment 2, manipulation effects on 
accuracy were rather limited and the main D-score findings were mostly driven by group 
differences in speed at responding during the guilt incongruent block where the guilty 
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groups were slower than the innocent group, presumably due to increased response 
conflict. 
 
Experiment 3 RT and Accuracy 
Mock Crime/Innocent event aIAT 
For RT (Fig. S3B), a 4 (Groups: Innocent, Guilty-Standard, Guilty-Alibi, and Guilty-Alibi 
with HT; between group) x 2 (Block: congruent and incongruent; within subject) mixed 
ANOVA showed that there were no main effect of neither group (F(3,140) = 1.587, p = .195, 
ηp2 = .033) nor block (F(1, 140) = 0.031, p = .861, ηp2 < .001). However, there was a 
significant group x block interaction (F(3, 140) = 5.91, p = .001, ηp2 = .112).  
 
Figure S3. Proportion accurate responses and mean response times for guilt-incongruent 
(True+Email/False+Ring) and guilt-congruent (True+Ring/False+Email) blocks of the 
Mock Crime/Innocent event aIAT in Experiment 3. Error bars denote 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Follow-up paired t-tests showed significantly faster RTs in the guilt congruent than the guilt 
incongruent block for the Guilty-Standard group (t(35) = 3.06, p = .004, d = 0.46), whereas 
the Guilty-Alibi group showed the reverse pattern with significant faster RTs in the guilt-
incongruent compared to the guilt-congruent block (t(35) = 2.52, p = .016, d = 0.30). There 
were no RT differences between the two blocks in Innocent (t(35) = 1.22, p = .231, d = 0.14), 
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and Guilty-Alibi with HT groups (t(35) = 0.67, p = .510, d = 0.11).  Independent t-tests 
(Table S1) were conducted to compare the groups within each block. The results showed that 
the Guilty-Standard group was significantly faster in the guilt congruent block than the 
Guilty-Alibi and Guilty-Alibi with HT groups, whilst the other comparisons were not 
significant. There were also no significant RT differences between any groups for the guilt  




For accuracy (Fig. S3A), a 4 (Groups: Innocent, Guilty-Standard, Guilty-Alibi, and Guilty-
Alibi with HT; between groups) x 2 (Block: guilt congruent and guilt incongruent; within 
subject) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of block (F(1, 140) = 4.15, p = 
.044, ηp2 = .029) and interaction between group and block (F(3, 140) = 3.46, p = .018, ηp2 = 
.069). However, there was no main effect of group (F(3, 140) = 0.22, p = .880, ηp2 = .005). 
Table S1. Independent t-test results comparing performance across groups during the Mock Crime/Innocent 
event aIAT in Experiment 3. 
 
RT ACC 
Guilt-congruent Guilt-incongruent Guilt-congruent Guilt-incongruent 
t p d t p d t p d t p d 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Standard 
1.80 .08 0.42 0.80 .43 0.19 1.58 .12 0.37 1.30 .20 0.31 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Alibi 
1.06 .30 0.25 0.21 .84 0.05 0.05 .96 0.01 0.49 .62 0.12 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Alibi with HT 
1.23 .22 0.29 1.83 .07 0.43 0.86 .39 0.20 0.38 .70 0.09 
Guilty-Standard vs. 
Guilty- Alibi 
2.34 .02 0.55 0.58 .56 0.14 1.46 .15 0.34 1.77 .08 0.42 
Guilty-Standard vs. 
Guilty-Alibi with HT 
2.75 .01 0.65 1.22 .23 0.29 0.72 .47 0.17 1.46 .15 0.35 
Guilty-Alibi vs. 
Guilty-Alibi with HT 
0.03 .98 0.01 1.65 .10 0.39 0.78 .44 0.18 0.03 .98 <0.001 
Note: Significant differences are marked in bold. Df = 70.  All t-values and d-values are absolute. 
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Follow-up paired t-tests indicated that Guilty-Standard group was more accurate in the guilt 
congruent block compared to the guilt incongruent block (t(35) = 3.78, p = .001, d = 0.73), 
whist there were no differences between blocks in Innocent (t(35) = 0.108, p = .915, d = 
0.02), Guilty-Alibi (t(35) = 0.38, p = .704, d = 0.07), or Guilty-Alibi with HT group (t(35) = 
0.804, p = .427, d = 0.10). There were no significant accuracy differences between groups in 
either guilt congruent or guilt incongruent blocks (see Table S1). Thus, similar to previous 
experiments, the strongest effects of the manipulation were on reaction times rather than 
accuracy, and the Standard Guilty group showed the expected effects on both measures most 
clearly (slower RT and lower accuracy in guilt incongruent than congruent blocks).  
 
Mock Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT 
For RTs (Fig. S4B), a 4 (group: innocent, Guilty-Standard, Guilty-Alibi, Guilty-Alibi with 
HT; between groups) x 2 (block: congruent, incongruent; within subject) mixed ANOVA 
showed significant main effect of block (F(1, 140) = 13.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .089)  and group x 
block interaction (F(3, 140) = 3.30, p = .022, ηp2 = .066). However, there was no main effect 
of group (F(3,140) = 0.54, p = .652, ηp2 = .012). 
 
Figure S4. Proportion accurate responses and mean response times from guilt-incongruent 
(True+Exam/False+Ring) and guilt-congruent (True+Ring/False+Exam) blocks of the Mock 




IMAGINING A FALSE ALIBI IMPAIRS MEMORY DETECTION 
 
62 
 Follow up paired t-tests revealed significant faster RTs in the guilt congruent than the 
incongruent block in Guilty-Standard (t(35) = 4.09, p < .001, d = 0.54) and Guilty-Alibi with 
HT groups (t(35) = 2.53, p = .016, d = 0.28). However, there were no significant RT 
differences between blocks in Innocent (t(35) = 0.635, p = .530, d = 0.07)  and Guilty-Alibi 
group (t(35) = 1.71, p = .096, d = 0.20). When comparing the groups directly, results showed 





A 4 (group: Innocent, Guilty-Standard, Guilty-Alibi, Guilty-Alibi with HT; between groups) 
x 2 (block: guilt-congruent, guilt-incongruent; within subject) mixed ANOVA was also 
conducted to examine accuracy (Fig. S4A). There was a significant main effect of block (F(1, 
140) = 7.52, p = .007, ηp2 =.051), but no main effect of group (F(3, 140) = 2.129, p = .099, 
Table S2. Independent t-test results comparing performance across groups during the Mock 
Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT in Experiment 3. 
 
RT ACC 
Guilt-congruent Guilt-incongruent Guilt-congruent Guilt-incongruent 
t p d t p d t p d t p d 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Standard 
0.81 .42 0.19 1.48 .14 0.35 0.19 .85 0.05 1.96 .054 0.47 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Alibi 
0.68 .50 0.16 0.48 .64 0.11 0.27 .79 0.06 1.30 .20 0.31 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Alibi with HT 
0.14 .89 0.03 1.64 .11 0.39 1.61 .11 0.38 <0.001 .99 <0.001 
Guilty-Standard vs. 
Guilty- Alibi 
0.04 .97 0.01 0.91 .37 0.22 0.07 .95 0.02 1.20 .24 0.29 
Guilty-Standard vs. 
Guilty-Alibi with HT 
0.93 .36 0.22 0.47 .64 0.11 1.55 .13 0.37 1.87 .07 0.45 
Guilty-Alibi vs. Guilty-
Alibi with HT 
0.80 .43 0.19 1.17 .25 0.28 1.61 .11 0.38    1.12 .27 0.27 
Note: Df = 70. All t-values and d-values are absolute. 
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ηp2 = .044) and no interaction effect (F(3, 140) = 2.275, p = .083, ηp2 = 046). Paired t-tests 
showed significant accuracy differences between blocks in the Guilty-Standard group (t(35) = 
2.13, p = .040, d = 0.45), but not in Innocent (t(35) = 0.415, p = .681, d = 0.07), Guilty-Alibi 
(t(35) = 1.66, p = .106, d = 0.30), nor Guilty-Alibi with HT groups (t(35) = 1.61, p = .116, d 
= 0.28). Independent t-tests were conducted to investigate accuracy differences between 
groups in guilt-congruent and guilt-incongruent blocks (Table S2). These showed only a 
trend towards a difference (p = .054) in the guilt-incongruent block when comparing Innocent 
and Guilty-Standard groups, and no other differences between groups in guilt-congruent nor 
guilt-incongruent blocks. Thus, as in the Mock Crime/Innocent event aIAT version and the 
previous experiments, the strongest and most consistent effects on RT and accuracy were in 
the standard guilty group. 
 
Innocent/Unexperienced event aIAT 
For RTs (Figure S5B), a 4 (group: Innocent, Guilty-Standard, Guilty-Alibi, Guilty-Alibi with 
HT; between groups) x 2 (block: congruent, incongruent; within subject) mixed ANOVA 
showed no main effect of block (F(1, 140) = 2.47, p = .118, ηp2 = .017), no main effect of 
group (F(3, 140) = 1.00, p = .394, ηp2 = .021), nor a block x group interaction (F(3, 140) = 
1.62, p = .188, ηp2 = .034). Follow up paired t-tests comparing the blocks within each groups 
showed no significant differences in RT between innocence-congruent and innocence-
incongruent blocks in Innocent (t(35) = 0.05, p = .960, d = 0.01), Guilty-Standard (t(35) = 
0.64, p = .527, d = 0.09), Guilty-Alibi (t(35) = 1.61, p = .116, d = 0.19), or Guilty-Alibi with 











Figure S5. Proportion accurate responses and mean response times from innocence-
incongruent (True+Exam/False+Email) and innocence-congruent 
(True+Email/False+Exam) blocks of the Innocent/Unexperienced event aIAT in Experiment 
3. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Independent t-tests also showed no differences between groups across either congruent or 
incongruent blocks, except RT in the innocence-incongruent block, where the Guilty-Alibi 
with HT group was significantly slower than the Guilty-Standard group (see Table S3). 
For accuracy (Fig. S5a), 4 (group: Innocent, Guilty-Standard, Guilty-Alibi, Guilty-Alibi with 
Table S3. Independent t-test results comparing performance across groups during the 











t p d t p d t p d t p d 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Standard 
0.22 .83 0.05 0.53 .60 0.13 1.12 .27 0.27 0.56 .58 0.13 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Alibi 
0.04 .97 0.01 0.80 .43 0.19 0.88 .38 0.21 0.54 .59 0.13 
Innocent vs. Guilty-
Alibi with HT 
0.77 .45 0.18 1.57 .12 0.38 0.66 .52 0.16 0.98 .33 0.24 
Guilty-Standard vs. 
Guilty- Alibi 
0.16 .87 0.04 1.39 .17 0.33 2.20 .03 0.52 0.93 .36 0.22 
Guilty-Standard vs. 
Guilty-Alibi with HT 
1.09 .28 0.26 2.40 .02 0.57 1.65 .11 0.39 0.46 .65 0.11 
Guilty-Alibi vs. Guilty-
Alibi with HT 
0.79 .43 0.19 0.64 .52 0.15 0.03 .98 0.01 1.22 .23 0.29 
Note: Significant differences are marked in bold. Df = 70. All t-values and d-values are absolute. 
A B 
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HT; between groups) x 2 (block: congruent, incongruent; within subject) mixed ANOVA 
showed no main effect of block (F(1, 140) = 1.77, p = .185, ηp2 = .012), no main effect of 
group (F(3, 140) = 0.55, p = .647, ηp2 = .012), nor block x group interaction (F(3, 140) = 
2.29, p = .081, ηp2 = .047). When comparing each block within the groups, there was no 
differences in accuracy between blocks in Innocent (t(35) = 1.00, p = .326, d = 0.16), Guilty-
Standard (t(35) = 1.19, p = .241, d = 0.24), Guilty-Alibi (t(35) = 1.61, p = .116, d = 0.19), and 
Guilty-Alibi with HT group (t(35) = 0.65, p = .519, d = 0.08). When comparing the groups 
within each block, there were no differences between groups in either innocence-congruent or 
innocence-incongruent blocks, except that the Guilty-Alibi group was more accurate than the 
Guilty-Standard group in the innocence-congruent block (see Table S3). Thus, RT and 
accuracy differences between blocks and groups were very small and mostly non-significant 
in the email/exam version of the aIAT, consistent with the main D-score analysis. 
So, in sum, the RT and Accuracy analysis across experiments converged with the D-
score analysis in suggesting that standard guilty participants who did not use a 
countermeasure could generally be distinguished from the Innocent group. This seemed to be 
driven both by RT and Accuracy differences. However, the Alibi countermeasure had the 
effect of making guilty participants appear more similar to innocent participants across 
measures and tests. 
 
Threshold based individual classification 
As previously mentioned, the aIAT was developed to diagnose guilt or innocence at the 
individual level, which is typically done by classifying individuals with positive D-scores 
as “guilty” and individuals with negative D-scores as “innocent” when contrasting a 
guilty vs. innocent event in this way (Sartori et al., 2008). Although such threshold based  
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classification can be problematic (see main paper), in a supplementary analysis we also 
tested group differences in classification rates this way in order to more directly compare 
our results to the previous literature. We first excluded participants scoring too close to 
zero (absolute D-scores between 0-0.2) as inconclusive based on previous 
recommendations (Agosta & Sartori, 2013), and then classified individuals with scores 
larger or smaller than this as guilty or innocent, as appropriate. 
In Experiment 1, after excluding inconclusive scores (excluded N for Guilty-
Standard = 11, Guilty-Alibi =13, Innocent = 10), we classified individuals as guilty 
(positive scores above 0.2) or innocent (negative scores below -0.2, see Agosta & Sartori, 
2013) and found that a significantly larger proportion of the Guilty-Standard Group were 
classified as guilty than in the Guilty-Alibi and Innocent groups, which were not 
significantly different from each other (see Table S4 for statistical results for all 
experiments). 
 
Table S4. Individual classifications as guilty or innocent across the three experiments with a D-
score threshold at >0.2. 
  
Percent of participants 
detected 
Pairwise differences in detection rates:  χ2 (φ) 




I vs.  GS GA 
vs. GS  






Experiment 1: Mock 
Crime/Innocent aIAT guilt 
detection 






- - - 
Experiment 2: Mock 
Crime/Unexperienced 
aIAT  guilt detection 






- - - 
Experiment 3:  Mock 
Crime/Innocent aIAT guilt 
detection 












Experiment 3:  Mock 
Crime/Unexperienced 
aIAT  guilt detection 












Experiment 3:  
Innocent/Unexperienced 
aIAT innocence detection 












Note: *= p<0.05, **= p<0.01, ***= p<0.001; I = Innocent; GA = Guilty-Alibi; GS = Guilty-Standard; GAHT = 
Guilty-Alibi with Home Training. Percentages were calculated after first excluding inconclusive scores (between 0.02 
and -0.02), and for all tests indicate guilt detection, except Experiment 3 Innocent/Unexperienced test, where they 
indicate innocence detection.  
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In Experiment 2, individuals who elicited a positive D-score were classified as 
“guilty” and these classification rates were compared between groups, after first 
excluding participants who scored too close to zero. Since this version of the aIAT is 
designed to elicit scores close to zero for innocent participants, this criterion led to a high 
number of exclusions for innocent participants (excluded N for Guilty-Standard = 8, 
Guilty-Alibi = 9, Innocent = 16). Threshold-based guilt classification in the Guilty-
Standard Group was similar to Experiment 1 and significantly higher than in the Innocent 
group. However in contrast to Experiment 1, the Guilty Alibi group also showed higher 
levels of guilt classification than the Innocent group, and no reduction compared to the 
Guilty-Standard group.   
In Experiment 3, we conducted separate classification analysis for the three 
different aIAT versions. For the mock crime/innocent act version, we classified 
individuals with a positive score as “guilty” and individuals with a negative score as 
“innocent” (Agosta et al., 2013), after first excluding participants who scored too close to 
zero (excluded N for Innocent = 14, Guilty-Standard = 17, Guilty-Alibi = 15; and Guilty-
Alibi with HT = 14). In this threshold-based analysis, guilt classification for the Guilty-
Standard group was similar to Experiments 1 and 2, and significantly higher than for the 
Innocent group (which also showed a similar rate as in Experiment 1). In the Guilty-Alibi 
with HT group, guilty classification was not significantly different from the Guilty-
Standard group, but it was significantly higher than in the Innocent group. Guilt 
classification for the Guilty-Alibi group was however significantly lower than both 
Guilty-Standard and Guilty-Alibi with HT groups, but not different from the Innocent 
group. 
For the mock crime/unexperienced event aIAT, we classified individuals as guilty 
if they scored above 0.2, and compared guilt detection proportions across groups after 
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excluding participants who obtained D-scores too close to zero (excluded N: Innocent = 
15, Guilty-Standard = 15, Guilty-Alibi = 19, Guilty-Alibi with HT = 10). Threshold-based 
guilt detection in the Guilty-Standard group was similarly high as in the previous 
experiments and the Mock Crime/Innocent aIAT in this Experiment, and again 
significantly higher than in the Innocent group. Guilt detection in the Guilty-Alibi and 
Guilty-Alibi with HT groups was lower, but not significantly different from each other or 
from the detection rates of the other groups. 
Finally, in the innocent/unexperienced aIAT version, individuals scoring higher 
than 0.2 were classified as innocent after excluding participants who scored too close to 
zero (excluded: Innocent = 11, Guilty-Standard = 20, Guilty-Alibi = 13, and Guilty-Alibi 
with HT = 13; see Table S4). This analysis showed that around 2/3 of the Guilty-Alibi 
with HT and Guilty-Alibi groups were erroneously identified as associating the innocent-
related sentences more with the truth than the unexperienced sentences, whereas 
surprisingly, only half of the Innocent group was correctly identified as such. This 
detection rate was similar to in the Guilty-Standard group, for which a 50% detection rate 
was predicted since they had no knowledge of either of the events. However, there were 
no significant differences among the groups in threshold-based classification rates. 
To summarise, the results from the threshold-based individual classification 
analysis supported the conclusions from the main group level and ROC analyses that guilt 
detection was reduced after participant rehearsed a false alibi, and that in Experiment 3, 
this countermeasure was most effective when the alibi was learned and imagined once 
just before the test. However, applying these thresholds to our data was problematic 
because many participants had to be excluded due to inconclusive D-scores (scores close 
to zero) rendering the remaining group sizes small. Furthermore, even when excluding 
scores close to zero, many innocent participants were erroneously classified as guilty, 
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which would be a serious problem in real life applications. We believe these patterns 
illustrates practical problems with using the aIAT D-score to classify individuals – 
depending on the design of the aIAT and the characteristics of the suspects, the test may 
produce inconclusive results rather than unambiguously guilty or innocent classifications, 
and even unambiguous results may be subject to many errors.  
 
Faking analysis 
In a final analysis, we calculated a “faking index” (Agosta et al., 2011) to assess whether 
rehearsing a false alibi would result in unusual reaction time patterns across aIAT blocks, 
since such patterns may function as signals of guilt even when the main guilt measure (i.e. D-
score) is disrupted by countermeasures. The faking index is based on calculating the ratio 
between the mean RT in whichever double classification block is fastest for a particular 
person (which presumably reflects the truth-congruent block for that person) with the mean 
RT in the corresponding single classification blocks, based on the logic that suspects who are 
trying to beat the test may be slowing down more in the critical double classification blocks 
than in the non-critical single classification blocks. Thus, the higher this index, the more that 
person is slowing down in the critical compared to non-critical blocks. To calculate the index, 
first all RTs below 150ms and above 10000ms were excluded. Next, any errors were replaced 
with the average RT of the block plus a penalty of 600ms. Finally, the ratio between the 
average RT of the fastest block (between 3 or 5) and single tasks that are directly connected 
to the fastest block in terms of motor response (1 and 2 or 1 and 4, respectively) was 
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Experiment 1 faking results 
In Experiment 1, the average faking index was higher in the Guilty-Alibi group (M=1.05, 
SD=0.20) than the Guilty-Standard (M = 0.97, SD = 0.15; t(70)=2.06, p =.043, d = 0.49) and 
Innocent groups (M = 0.95, SD = 0.15; t(70) = 2.43, p =.02, d = 0.58), who did not differ 
from each other (t(70) = 0.40, p = .69, d = 0.10). Using a cut-off value of 1.08 on the index 
(as suggested by Agosta et al., 2011), around 47% of the Guilty-Alibi group but only 19% of 
the Guilty-Standard group were classified as faking, and these rates were significantly 
different (χ2(1) = 6.25, p = .012, φ = .30). Faking classification was also higher in the Guilty-
Alibi group than in the Innocent group (25%; χ2(1) = 3.85, p = .050, φ = 0.23), however 
classification rates did not differ between Guilty-Standard and Innocent groups (χ2(1) = 0.32, 
p = .570, φ = 0.07). 
Similar to the D-score analysis, we also conducted a threshold-independent ROC 
analysis to evaluate faking classification performance. This analysis is appropriate 
because the most suitable threshold to use for detecting faking may differ across studies. 
The ROC analyses showed that when comparing Guilty-Alibi and Innocent groups, faking 
classification was significantly better than chance (AUC = .65, SE = .07, p = .027). When 
comparing Guilty-Standard and Innocent groups, faking classification was not different 
from chance (AUC = .55, SE = .07, p = .480). Thus, the faking analysis showed that guilty 
suspects who rehearsed a false alibi may reveal themselves by unusual reaction time 
patterns across aIAT blocks, although classification performance based on the faking-
index was fairly poor. With only a 65% probability of classifying an individual correctly, 
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Experiment 2 faking results 
In Experiment 2, there were no difference between Innocent (M = 1.01, SD = .18) and 
Guilty-Standard groups (M = 0.94, SD = 0.16; t(70) = 1.78, p = .080, d = 0.42), Innocent 
and Guilty-Alibi groups (M = 0.97, SD = 0.16; t(70) = 1.00, p = .320, d = 0.24), nor 
Guilty-Standard and Guilty-Alibi groups (t(70) = 0.80, p = .427, d = 0.19) in the average 
faking index. Using the 1.08 cut-off as suggested by Agosta and colleagues (2011), 25% 
of the Guilty-Alibi group and 17% of the Guilty-Standard group were classified as faking, 
which was not significantly different (χ2(1) = 0.76, p = .384, φ = 0.103). There was also 
no difference between Innocent (31%) and Guilty-Alibi groups (χ2(1) = 0.28, p = .599, φ 
= 0.06) nor between Innocent and Guilty-Standard groups (χ2(1) = 1.93, p = .165, φ = 
0.16) in faking classification proportions. 
 The ROC analysis showed that faking classification was not different from chance 
when comparing Innocent and Guilty-Alibi groups (AUC = .56, SE = .07, p = .368), nor 
when comparing Innocent and Guilty-Standard groups (AUC = .60, SE = .07, p = .128), nor 
when comparing Guilty-Alibi groups and Guilty-Standard groups (AUC = .55, SE = .07, p = 
454). Thus, the faking analysis in Experiment 2 showed that rehearsing an alibi did not cause 
any unusual reaction time patterns across aIAT blocks when the aIAT contrasted the mock 
crime with an unexperienced event, because faking classification was relatively low and 
similar across all groups. 
 
Experiment 3 faking results 
Mock Crime/Innocent event aIAT 
In the aIAT version that contrasted the mock crime and alibi/innocent act directly in 
Experiment 3, there were no significant differences between Innocent (M = 1.14, SD = 0.16) 
and Guilty-Standard groups (M = 1.10, SD = 0.19; t(70) = 0.93, p = .354, d = 0.22), Innocent 
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and Guilty-Alibi groups (M = 1.15, SD = 0.19; t(70) = 0.41, p = .683, d = 0.10), Innocent and 
Guilty-Alibi with HT groups (M = 1.21, SD = 0.20; t(70) = 1.57, p = .121, d = 0.37), Guilty-
Standard and Guilty-Alibi groups (t(70) = 1.25, p = .215, d = 0.30), or Guilty-Alibi and 
Guilty-Alibi with HT groups (t(70) = 1.11, p = .272, d = 0.26) in the average faking index. 
However, the average faking index was lower in the Guilty-Standard than Guilty-Alibi with 
HT group (t(70) = 2.31, p = .024, d = 0.54). Using the 1.08 cut-off as suggested by Agosta 
and colleagues (2011), 53% of Guilty-Standard, 67% of Guilty-Alibi, 69% of Innocent and 
72% of Guilty-Alibi with HT group were classified as faking in the ring/email classification 
aIAT. These classification rates were not different (Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi group: 
χ2(1) = 1.44, p = .230, φ = 0.142; Guilty-Standard vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT group: χ2(1) = 
2.90, p = .088, φ = 0.201; Guilty-Alibi vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT: χ2(1) = 0.262, p = .61, φ = 
.060; Innocent vs. Guilty-Standard group: χ2(1) = 2.10, p = .147, φ = 0.171; Innocent vs. 
Guilty-Alibi group: χ2(1) = 0.064, p = .800, φ = .030; Innocent vs. Guilty-Alibi with HT 
group: χ2(1) = .067, p = .795, φ = 0.031) 
 The ROC analyses showed that the classification was not different from chance when 
comparing Innocent with Guilty-Standard group (AUC = .54, SE = .07, p = .612), when 
comparing Innocent with Guilty-Alibi group (AUC = .56, SE = .07, p = .386), or when 
comparing Innocent with Guilty-Alibi with HT group (AUC = .60, SE = .068, p = .128). 
There were also no differences in classification performance between Guilty-Standard and 
Guilty-Alibi group (AUC = .57, SE = .068, p = .290) or between Guilty-Alibi and Guilty-
Alibi with HT (AUC = .56, SE = .07, p = .356). However, the classification performance was 
just significantly better than chance when comparing Guilty-Standard with Guilty-Alibi with 
HT group (AUC = .63, SE = .065, p = .050). Thus, faking analyses showed that when the 
aIAT contrasted the mock crime to the innocent/alibi event, rehearsing an alibi repeatedly 
over a week may cause unusual response patterns in the aIAT blocks, but this effect was 
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rather weak and only significant when compared to a guilty standard group, and not 
compared to the other groups. 
 
Mock Crime/Unexperienced event aIAT 
In the mock crime vs. unexperienced event aIAT version, there were no differences between 
Innocent (M = 1.12, SE = .21) and Guilty-Standard (M = 1.14, SE = 0.19; t(70) = 0.475, p = 
.636, d = 0.11), Innocent and Guilty-Alibi (M = 1.18, SE = 0.22; t(70) = 1.14, p = .259, d = 
0.27), or Innocent and Guilty-Alibi with HT groups (M = 1.13, SE = 0.18; t(70) = 0.22, p = 
.827, d = 0.05) in the average faking index. There were also no differences in faking index 
between Guilty-Standard and Guilty-Alibi (t(70) = 0.716, p = .476, d = 0.17), Guilty-
Standard and Guilty-Alibi with HT (t(70) = 0.279, p = .781, d = 0.07), or Guilty-Alibi and 
Guilty-Alibi with HT groups (t(70) = 0.992, p = .325, d = 0.23). 
Using the 1.08 classification cut-off as suggested by Agosta et al. (2011), 56% of 
Guilty-Standard group and 64% of Guilty-Alibi group were classified as faking and this was 
not significantly different (χ2(1) = 0.52, p = .471, φ = 0.085). There was also no difference 
between Guilty-Standard and Guilty-Alibi with HT (72%; χ2(1) = 2.17, p = .141, φ = 0.173), 
and Guilty-Standard and Innocent group (also 56%, so both groups were the same). There 
was also no significant difference when comparing Innocent to Guilty-Alibi group (χ2(1) = 
0.52, p = .471, φ = 0.085), Innocent to Guilty-Alibi with HT group (χ2(1) = 2.17, p = .141, φ 
= 0.173), and Guilty-Alibi and Guilty-Alibi with HT group (χ2(1) = 0.58, p = .448, φ = 0.089) 
in faking classification at this threshold. 
Threshold independent ROC analysis showed that faking classification was not 
different from chance when comparing Innocent and Guilty-Alibi group (AUC = .57, SE = 
.068, p = .280), Innocent and Guilty-Alibi with HT (AUC = .54, SE = .069, p = .551), 
Innocent and Guilty-Standard (AUC = .53, SE = .069, p = .693) and Guilty-Alibi and Guilty-
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Alibi with HT (AUC = .55, SE = .07, p = .471). When compared to Guilty-Standard group, 
the classification of Guilty-Alibi group (AUC = .56, SE = .068, p = .375) and Guilty-Alibi 
with HT (AUC = .52, SE = .069, p = .787) as fakers was also at chance. Thus, according to 
the faking index all of the groups showed equal amounts of unusual slowing in double 
classification blocks in this aIAT version. 
 
 
Innocent/Unexperienced event aIAT 
In the innocent vs. unexperienced event version of the aIAT, there was no difference between 
Innocent (M = 1.15, SD = .14) and Guilty-Standard (M = 1.15, SD = 0.16; t(70) = .03, p = 
.979, d = 0.01), Innocent and Guilty-Alibi (M = 1.18, SD = 0.17; t(70) = 0.66, p = .509, d = 
0.16), and Innocent and Guilty-Alibi with HT (M = 1.11, SD = 0.19; t(70) = 1.11, p = .270, d 
= 0.26) in mean faking score. There were also no differences in mean faking score between 
Guilty-Standard and Guilty-Alibi (t(70) = 0.66, p = .513, d = 0.15), Guilty-Standard and 
Guilty-Alibi with HT (t(70) = 1.04, p = .301, d = 0.25), and Guilty-Alibi and Guilty-Alibi 
with HT (t(70) = 1.60, p = .114, d = 0.38). 
Using the 1.08 cut-off (Agosta et al., 2011), 64% of Innocent group and 67% of 
Guilty-Standard group were classified as faking and these rates were not significantly 
different (χ2(1) = 0.06, p = .804, φ = 0.03), neither were Innocent and Guilty-Alibi groups 
(83%; χ2(1) = 3.50, p = .061, φ = 0.22), nor were Innocent and Guilty-Alibi with HT group 
(64% also). There were also no differences in faking classification between Guilty-Standard 
and Guilty-Alibi group (χ2(1) = 2.67, p = .102, φ = 0.19), Guilty-Standard and Guilty-Alibi 
with HT (χ2(1) = 0.06, p = .804, φ = 0.03), and Guilty-Alibi and Guilty-Alibi with HT (χ2(1) 
= 3.50, p = .061, φ = 0.22). 
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The ROC analyses showed that faking classification was not different from chance 
when comparing Innocent and Guilty-Standard group (AUC = .53, SE = .069, p = .719), 
Innocent and Guilty-Alibi group (AUC = .54, SE = .069, p = .547), and Innocent and Guilty-
Alibi with HT (AUC = .55, SE = .069, p =.451). Classification performance was also at 
chance when comparing Guilty-Standard to Guilty-Alibi (AUC = .58, SE = .069, p = .270), 
Guilty-Standard to Guilty-Alibi with HT (AUC = .54 SE = .069, p = .558), and Guilty-Alibi 
to Guilty-Alibi with HT (AUC = .59, SE = .068, p = .188). 
So, in sum, although the faking analysis was able to detect a proportion of Guilty-
Alibi participants as fakers in Experiment 1, this measure did not detect faking in Experiment 
2 nor in any of the three aIAT versions in Experiment 3 (apart from one difference between 
Guilty-Standard and Guilty-Alibi with HT groups).  In Experiment 3, all groups had higher 
faking scores than in Experiments 1 and 2, which is likely because all groups completed three 
versions of the aIAT and therefore had more practice at the tasks. Practice would be expected 
to produce different RT patterns across blocks compared to when participants only completed 
one aIAT as in the prior two experiments (and also in Agosta et al., 2011). The results thus 
suggest that the faking index only has limited usefulness against a false alibi countermeasure, 
which is likely because the alibi participants were not trying to beat the test by intentionally 
altering their response times, which is what they were doing in the previous studies that have 
shown better detection of fakers (Agosta, et al., 2011). Rather, the alibi countermeasure 
produced RT patterns that were fairly similar to a truly innocent group, meaning that these 
participants were not likely to be detected as faking. 
 
